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ABSTRACT 
The period from 2006 to 2015 was a turbulent one for mining companies.  The end 
of the 2000s commodity super cycle resulted in all-time high market values for 
most commodity based companies, followed by a rapid decline in value with the 
onset of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 and a similar rapid recovery following 
this.  Whilst much of this change in value was driven by commodity prices, the 
inconsistent performance between companies suggests that there are other 
factors affecting mining company value.  
To determine the key drivers of company value, four diversified and international 
mining companies which represent close to 50% of the 2006 industry revenue 
were selected for analysis.  These were Anglo American, BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and 
CVRD-Vale.  Financial and production data was collected to analyse different 
potential value drivers.  Because of its suitability for comparison of company value, 
the market based valuation approach was selected as the company valuation 
technique.  Enterprise value (EV) was the metric used for company value since this 
provides a measure of the real market value of a firm as a whole business.  Eight 
potential value drivers, which include production output, commodity price, 
revenue, EBITDA margin, EBITDA multiple, gearing ratio, net debt to EBITDA ratio 
and ROCE, were selected for analysis.  Each potential value driver was tracked 
against EV to determine if there was any correlation between the value driver and 
EV.  Also, the Pearson correlation method was used to determine correlation 
between each potential value driver and EV.   
Production output and commodity price in isolation were found not to drive 
company value.  However, when combined to calculate revenue, had a very high 
correlation to EV with an average Pearson coefficient of 0.8.  EBITDA multiple was 
also found to be a key driver of company value, with this metric closely aligned to 
revenue (Pearson coefficient of 0.6).  The two debt metrics, gearing ratio and net 
debt to EBITDA were found to only have a correlation to EV in times of declining 
commodity prices and revenue.  EBITDA margin and ROCE were found to have no 
correlation to EV and as such were not considered to be key drivers of company 
value.  Mining companies must ensure that they focus on the correct value drivers 
to ensure those they influence do impact the company value.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter provides an introduction, background and objectives of this research 
study.  Firstly, an introduction to the problem provides the context of the 
relevance of the research.  Then an overview of the research problem and 
objectives are presented.  Finally, an explanation and justification for the selection 
of the four major mining companies which were analysed as part of this research 
study, and a background to the history of each of these companies is provided. 
1.2 Background 
“A commodity super-cycle occurs over multiple decades during which the rise in 
commodity prices is observed across the board, before declining for a long period” 
(Media, 2012, p1).  The 2000s commodities super-cycle saw widespread growth 
for most mining companies as rising demand for commodities from emerging 
markets pushed commodity prices to all-time highs over a very short period of 
time.  This boom was sharply brought to an end in 2008 with the onset of the 
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) which saw commodity prices declining to close to pre-
2001 levels.  Since then there has been a recovery and subsequent downturn of 
commodity prices.  Such commodity price cycles are inherent to the mining 
industry, and something that mining companies understand and plan for. 
Throughout these cycles, major mining companies have seen fluctuations in their 
market values, rising to high levels at the end of the boom times and in some cases 
dropping just as quickly with downturns in the economy.  Whilst the simplest 
explanation for this would be a direct link between company value and 
commodities prices, some companies have fared better than others throughout 
the commodity price cycles.  This suggests that commodity prices are not the only 
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driver of company value and as such mining executives must consider other drivers 
in order to preserve and increase company value.   
The economics of the mining industry is unique compared to that of other 
industries, with an entire field of study, known as mineral economics, dedicated 
to this.  Factors such as the non-renewable nature of mineral resources, high 
capital costs, the long lead time required to develop projects, and supply/demand 
variations make mineral economics generally more complex than economic 
studies of other industries (Maxwell, 2006).  These factors make the valuation of 
mining companies much more difficult, with numerous factors, or value drivers, 
influencing performance and value. 
The identification of the value drivers can be used by company executives to 
ensure that all strategic and operational decisions are aligned to the primary 
company objective of increasing value.  As recommended by Krinks et al. (2011, 
p22) every mining company “needs to have a clear plan for differential value 
creation, beyond relying on commodity prices”.  An understanding of these value 
drivers is important for company leaders whose goal is to increase value, through 
to financial analysts who try to predict changes in company value.  An improved 
understanding and recognition of these drivers will be beneficial to guide decision-
making by these industry leaders.   
1.3 Research problem and question 
Given the varied company performance in terms of market value over the past 10 
years whilst operating in the same global commodities market, it would appear 
that commodity prices are not the sole driver of company value.  For example, 
how is it that Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP) Billiton’s share price was up by 50% 
over the period from 2006 to 2015 yet the share price of another of the majors, 
Anglo American was down by 60% over the same period?  This raises the question: 
“What are the value drivers that lead to differences in company value changes?” 
 Page 3 
 
 
1.4 Research objectives 
This study analysed the hypothesis on whether the variable performance in 
company value between four major mining companies, as measured by enterprise 
value, can be traced to a number of key value drivers.  This hypothesis was 
explored by analysing company enterprise value over the 10 year period from 
2006 to 2015, against identified key value drivers during the same period to 
determine any patterns between market performance and the value drivers.   
The objectives of this research study were to: 
 Review available literature on enterprise value to determine possible value 
drivers; 
 Collect the relevant company performance and value driver data from 
available company reports; 
 Develop indexed comparison of company value versus each of the value 
drivers; 
 Analyse this data to identify any correlation and trends between potential 
value drivers and company value; 
 Identify key drivers of company value over the period; and 
 Provide a recommendation on where companies should focus in order to 
preserve and increase company value. 
It is important to note that the objective of this project is not to do a specific 
valuation of any of the mining stocks.  Instead, it is to do a statistical analysis of 
value drivers against indexed enterprise value to determine any trends between 
value drivers and value.  As such valuation techniques such as the discounted cash 
flow, real option pricing, comparable transaction or other approaches were not 
considered in this study. 
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1.5 Research scope 
The research study focused on four major international diversified mining 
companies being, in alphabetical order, Anglo American Plc, BHP Billiton Ltd / 
South 32, Rio Tinto Group and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD-Vale).  Whilst 
Glencore and Xstrata could be considered, their 2013 merger makes it difficult to 
analyse the pure value drivers to performance over this period, and thus they were 
excluded as discussed in Section 1.6.   
The period from 2006 to 2015 was selected as it represents a range of economic 
conditions for a comprehensive analysis of mining companies.  The period 2006 – 
2008 represents a time when the mining boom saw mining companies making 
extraordinary profits.  This was followed by a brief, but drastic downturn with the 
onset of the GFC, and subsequent rapid recovery during 2010 and 2011.  Then 
following this, the period 2011 to 2015 saw a steady downward trend in 
commodity prices and increased pressure on mining companies to reduce 
expenditure and react to these softer prices.   
1.6 Selection and justification of mining companies 
In order to identify any trends between value drivers and enterprise value, a range 
of mining companies had to be selected and analysed.  However, it is important to 
note that within the mining industry two distinct sizes of companies exist, the 
majors and the juniors.  The difference between the two is very important for 
company valuation, as outlined by Beattie (2016).  The majors are traditionally well 
capitalised with steady cash flows.  As such, in theory, their enterprise value 
should be relatively stable or experience steady growth.  Juniors on the other 
hand, tend to be speculative with hopes of a discovery of a feasible mineral 
resource to boost returns.  For this reason the drivers of value are much more 
difficult to track, reliant on exploration with big risks and reward.  Therefore, this 
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research focused only on major mining companies which can be reliably evaluated 
for differing performance due to different value drivers.  
For the purpose of this report, major mining companies are defined as multiple 
commodity, publically listed mining companies.  For these major mining 
companies, revenue is essentially a measure of sales, thus, by ranking companies 
by revenue it was possible to select which companies have the biggest influence 
on the global commodities market.  As such, the companies selected should have 
revenue which represents a major portion of the total worldwide commodity 
sales. 
According to Price Waterhouse Coopers (2007), for the 2006 calendar year the top 
four mining companies accounted for nearly 43% of the total revenue and almost 
47% of profit before interest and tax for the top 40 mining companies.  These top 
four companies included Anglo American plc, BHP Billiton Group, Rio Tinto Group 
and CVRD-Vale with their contributions to revenue as shown in Table 1.1.  It is 
possible to increase the share of revenue and profit before interest and tax to 
above 50% by including a fifth company, which was Xstrata plc.   
Table 1.1: Top five mining companies by revenue - 2006 
Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers (2007) 
  2006 (USD billion) 
Total revenue 237.0 
Anglo American PLC 33.1 14% 
BHP Billiton group 32.8 14% 
Rio Tinto group 22.5 9% 
CVRD-Vale 19.7 9% 
Xstrata 17.1 7% 
Top 4 companies 109.3 46% 
Top 5 companies 126.4 53% 
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These five companies, at the time and historically, have been considered the 
world’s major international mining companies and should represent a fair range 
of data for performance analysis.  However, this is just a snapshot as of 2006.     
Over the eight year period following this, from 2006 to 2014, BHP Billiton, CVRD-
Vale, Rio Tinto and Xstrata have all remained within the top four revenue earners 
of mining companies.  Anglo American however has made a steady decline year-
on-year to be ranked twenty seventh by revenue as of 2015 (Price Waterhouse 
Coppers, 2016).  These 2006 top five companies by 2015 were ranked as per Table 
1.2.  As can be seen, whilst BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto have retained the top two 
positions, the other companies have dropped significantly.   
Table 1.2: Mining company ranking by revenue - 2015 
Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers (2016) 
 2015 ranking (by revenue) 
BHP Billiton 1st 
Rio Tinto 2nd 
Xstrata/Glencore 6th 
CVRD-Vale 8th 
Anglo American 27th 
 
The other three positions for 2015 were filled by companies from three emerging 
countries.  These three companies are China Shenhua Energy Company Limited, 
Coal India Limited and MMC Norilsk Nickel from Russia.  The analysis of the value 
drivers for these three companies for the period of 2006 to 2015 is much more 
difficult as their financial details are not readily available in the public domain.  As 
such, the top five companies by revenue from 2006, all of which are international 
publically listed traditional mining companies, were considered for this research 
study. 
In May 2013 Xstrata formally merged with Glencore, a Switzerland based 
commodities trading company, to form the mining conglomerate Glencore 
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Xstrata.  At the time of the merger the new London listed company rivalled Rio 
Tinto for size (Solly, 2013).  Since this merger was towards the end of the period 
of analysis for this research study, it is difficult to isolate this in terms of enterprise 
value for the company.  Whilst the other companies have all gone through smaller 
mergers, acquisitions and sales during the period of analysis, none of them were 
as significant as the Xstrata Glencore merger.  As such, Xstrata was excluded from 
this analysis. 
Therefore, this research study was restricted to the analysis of the top four mining 
companies by revenue as of 2006, these being Anglo American plc (referred 
throughout as Anglo American), BHP Billiton Group (referred to as BHP Billiton), 
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (referred to as CVRD-Vale) and the Rio Tinto Group 
(referred to as Rio Tinto). 
1.7 Introduction to the selected major mining companies 
This section of the report provides a brief overview and history of the four mining 
companies selected for analysis.  In many cases the history of the company is 
important to understand changes in productivity and economic performance.   
1.7.1 Anglo American plc 
According to the company history by Anglo American (2016a), the company was 
founded in 1917 by Sir Ernest Oppenheimer using a combination of capital from 
sources in Britain and the United States, hence the name Anglo American.  The 
initial focus for the company was gold mining in the East Rand in South Africa.  In 
the 1920s the company broadened its commodity focus, through exploration for 
platinum in South Africa and adding diamonds by becoming the largest single 
shareholder of De Beers.  Over the next 50 years the company expanded into coal, 
copper, iron and a number of other products and services (Spector, 2012).  In the 
late 1960s and early 1970s the company expanded further out of the commodities 
sector to include the steel and pulp/paper industry through acquisition of Scaw 
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Metals and Mondi Group.  Much of the investment in the non-mining sector was 
as a result of restrictions in place due to South Africa’s Apartheid regime.  In 1987 
the company purchased a wine estate, Vergelegen, which it still owns at the time 
of this research study. 
By the end of Apartheid in 1994 the company was the world’s largest producer of 
gold and platinum group metals, as well as a major producer of gold, diamonds, 
copper, nickel, iron ore and coal.  With operations worldwide, it was one of the 
top three mining companies in the world.  With the end of Apartheid removing 
trade restrictions, the company began to sell-off many of its non-core businesses 
and replaced them with other international mining opportunities.   
By the early 2000s Anglo American was still very much a diversified mining 
company, having changed its primary listing to the London Stock Exchange in 1999.  
Over the next 10 years the company continued to expand with the following 
transactions (Anglo American, 2016a): 
 2001 - Purchase of Shell Petroleum Company’s Australian coal asset; 
 2002 - Acquired the Los Bronces and El Soldado copper mines in Chile to 
become Chile’s third largest copper producer; 
 2002 – Acquired a major stake in Kumba Resources South Africa, increasing 
its exposure to iron ore; 
 2007 – Completely divested from gold through the formation and sale of 
AngloGold Ashanti; 
 2007 – Sold off its Mondi Group, the paper and packaging business; 
 2007 – Made an initial investment in the Minas-Rio iron ore project in 
Brazil; 
 2012 – Increased its stake in De Beers from 45% to 85%; and 
 2015 – Sold its stake in Lafarge Tarmac – a building materials company. 
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The company has received significant criticism for its investment in the Minas Rio 
Iron Ore Project in Brazil.  Since its purchase in 2007 for $5.1bn, at close to the 
peak of the iron ore boom, the total project cost was running well above $13bn in 
2015 (Seccombe, 2015).  This initial purchase, and subsequent project investment, 
has weighed heavily on the company’s debt levels as is outlined later in this report. 
In 2015 Anglo American was the worst performing stock on the Financial Times 
Stock Exchange 100 Index (FTSE 100) dropping more than 73% for the year, only 
slightly worse than Glencore’s 72% drop (Biesheuvel & Crowley, 2015).  However, 
for the first half of 2016 the share price recovered over half of those losses, as the 
company promised to reduce debt via the sale of multiple assets and a focus on 
three primary commodities – diamonds, platinum and copper.  As of the end of 
2015, the company’s revenue was split fairly evenly between five main 
commodities being platinum, diamonds, coal, base metals (copper and nickel) and 
iron ore with a very small portion from niobium phosphates and corporate 
activities.   
1.7.2 BHP Billiton Group 
BHP Billiton was formed out of a 2001 merger between two small mining 
companies, Broken Hill Proprietary Limited and Billiton, both with histories dating 
back to the 1880s (BHP Billiton, 2016a).  This merger formed the world’s largest 
diversified resources company with operations in 20 countries and commodities 
which include aluminium, coal, copper, ferro-alloys, iron ore, titanium, nickel, 
diamonds and silver, as well as a large energy sector (Pederson, 2005).  In 2005, 
the merged company purchased WMC Resources, an Australian based copper, 
gold and uranium major, adding uranium to its already diverse portfolio of 
commodities.  Then in late 2007, at the peak of the commodities boom, the 
company announced plans to take over rival Rio Tinto.  However, this did not 
happen due to the onset of the GFC.   
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From 2007 the company made a number of small purchases and sales, until in 
2014 when it announced plans for a demerger of a number of operations to create 
an independent metals company based on “a selection of its high-quality 
aluminium, coal, manganese, nickel and silver assets” (BHP Billiton, 2014a, p1).  
The company said the remaining assets would allow for a focus on the large, long-
life iron ore, copper, coal, petroleum and potash business.  The spinoff company, 
South 32, which formally listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in May 2015, has 
struggled with falling commodity prices, dropping by 50% on the ASX by the end 
of 2015 and then recovering to the same listing price in September 2016.  As this 
demerger occurred during the period of this research study, South 32’s production 
and performance was included in the analysis. 
From 2015 the company has focused on a strategy to “own and operate large, 
long-life, low-cost, expandable, upstream assets diversified by commodity, 
geography and market” (BHP Billiton, 2016b, p1).  As of the end of 2015, 
approximately one-third of the company’s revenue was from iron ore, one quarter 
each from petroleum (including potash) and copper and the remainder from coal 
and other corporate activities.   
1.7.3 Rio Tinto Group  
According to the history of the company by Rio Tinto (2016b), the company was 
formed in London in 1873 through the purchase of the rights to mine ancient 
copper mines in southern Spain.  In the 1920s the company started to diversify out 
of Spain, with investment in copper mines in then Rhodesia, Africa.  By the 1950s 
the company had sold-off two-thirds of its interests in Spain and used these funds 
to invest in bauxite in Australia.  As such, in the 1960’s the company started to 
build a large iron ore empire, which today makes it the world’s second largest iron 
ore producer behind CVRD-Vale (Minerals Council of Australia, 2015).  In 1983 the 
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company added diamonds to its portfolio with the opening of the Argyle Diamond 
Mine in Australia.   
The company continued to grow and in the year 2000, right at the start of the 
minerals boom, it undertook US$4 billion worth of acquisitions - primarily 
Australian aluminium, iron ore, diamond and coal assets.  This was further backed 
up by the 2007 acquisition of Alcan, creating a world leader in aluminium 
production.  By the early 2010s the company was a major player in iron ore, 
aluminium, copper, coal and diamonds.  In 2015 the company received over 40% 
of its revenue from iron ore, close to a quarter each from aluminium and 
copper/coal (grouped together for reporting) and the remaining 10% from 
diamonds and other minerals.   
1.7.4 Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD-Vale) 
According to Vale (2012a) which provided the history of the company, Companhia 
Vale do Rio Doce, known then as CVRD, was founded in 1942 by the Brazilian 
Federal Government, to form a state owned mining company.  The company’s 
initial focus was on iron ore, and by 1974 it was the world’s biggest exporter of 
iron ore, a title it still holds at the time of writing this report.  In 1997, 
approximately 42% of the company was auctioned off as part of a partial 
privatisation of the company.   The focus on iron ore remained until the 2000’s 
when the company started to diversify into other minerals.  The largest of these 
diversification moves was the 2006 purchase of the Canadian copper, nickel and 
other metals producer Inco Limited.   
In the following year, as part of its move from being a local iron ore miner to a 
global diversified company, the group launched a rebranding to be known as Vale 
rather than the traditional CVRD.  In 2007 Vale entered the coal mining sector 
through the purchase of AMCI Holdings Australia, and opened coal assets in 
Mozambique.  In 2012 the company added gold to its portfolio with the opening 
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of the Salobo Mine in Brazil.   By the end of 2013, after 70 years since formation, 
the company had a presence in more than 35 countries with operations producing 
all the major commodities, excluding diamonds, and was one of the top five mining 
companies worldwide.  In 2015 the company received close to 70% of its revenue 
from ferrous metals, 20% from nickel and the remainder from copper, coal and 
fertilisers. 
1.8 Chapter conclusion and structure of the report 
As the history of the four major mining companies included in this research report 
shows, all are multi commodity, diversified international mining companies.  Thus 
they are appropriate for analysis of value drivers for differing company value 
performance.  Chapter 2 of this report provides a literature review of the theory 
behind company value and valuation techniques.  It also provides a review of 
possible value drivers for mining companies.   
Chapter 3 describes the research methodology used, identifying the value drivers 
to be analysed and explaining the data collection and analysis process.  As all data 
was collected from publically available company financial and production reports, 
the different values extracted from these reports are explained.  Any calculations 
required to determine the value drivers are also detailed.    
Chapter 4 presents and analyses the data, first by showing the variation in 
company performance over the 10 year period, and then presenting each of the 
different potential value drivers for each company.  These are primarily presented 
in graphical form with any required detail provided in the text.  Statistical 
correlation analysis is also undertaken on the valuation multiples and the capital 
efficiency drivers, to determine the correlation between these and enterprise 
value.  This analysis identifies the potential value drivers which significantly 
influence and are key to company value performance.   
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Chapter 5 summarises the results on the identified key value drivers.  Conclusions 
derived from the data analysis and key value drivers are also provided.  Finally, this 
chapter provides a number of recommendations, tying the results back to the 
objectives and identify how companies should consider these drivers when 
targeting company value. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter provides background information on the research topic.  Much has 
been written around the economic theory and practice of company valuation.  As 
such the concept of company value and valuation is introduced, to determine the 
most appropriate value metric for this study.  Mineral asset valuation is also 
introduced to understand its relevance in comparison to company valuation.  Then 
the different metrics and techniques for market valuation are reviewed and 
discussed to identify the different possible value drivers which influence company 
value. 
2.2 Overview of company value, value drivers and valuation 
approaches 
Value is defined as the material or monetary worth of something (Oxford 
Dictionary, 2016).  When dealing with company value, this can include not only 
the monetary value of the business but also shareholder value, employee value 
and societal value.  However, in terms of this study, value and valuation are linked 
to the monetary value of the business.  “Value is a particularly helpful measure of 
performance because it takes into account the long-term interest of all 
stakeholders in a company, not just the shareholders” (Koller et al., 2005, p3).  As 
such, changes in the value of a company over time can be used as a measure of 
whether a company has performed positively or negatively.  The process to 
calculate this value is known as company valuation defined by Investopedia 
(2016a, p1) as a “process of determining the economic value of a business or 
company”.  Whilst the most common use of valuation is the buying and selling of 
operations/companies, as identified by Fernàndez (2007) company valuation can 
also be used to identify and stratify sources of economic value creation and 
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destruction.  In other words the purpose is to identify the value drivers for a 
company.    
L.E.K Consulting (nd, p2) suggested that “by focusing on value drivers, 
management can prioritize the specific activities that will affect performance in 
each area”.  However, for many companies the challenge is to understand which 
value drivers have the biggest influence on company value.  Similarly, whilst some 
value drivers may have a big impact on value, management may have little 
influence on these and not be able to change them.  The different value drivers, 
based on value impact and management influence should therefore be ranked and 
considered as per Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 : Value driver matrix for prioritising value drivers 
Source: L.E.K. Consulting (nd) 
 Page 16 
 
 
From this figure it can be seen that management must focus on and manage the 
drivers with highest impact on value, giving less priority to those which are of 
lower impact or which they have less influence over.  These high priority drivers 
should be considered key value drivers and should form part of management’s key 
performance indicators (KPI’s).  As such, this study focused on determining those 
value drivers which have the highest value impact 
One important distinction that must be made which is specific to mining 
companies is company valuation versus mineral asset valuation.  Mineral asset 
valuation is used to determine the value of a specific resource or operation and 
are used by mining companies to ascertain the value of their assets for impairment 
test, annual audits or investor corporate communications (Deloitte, 2016a).  
Njowa et al. (2013) described ongoing work from the late 2000’s to develop a 
globally accepted mineral asset valuation template, rather than having individual 
regional codes.  This is in an attempt to harmonise the three current major codes 
being: 
 The Code for the Technical Assessment and Valuation of Mineral and 
Petroleum Assets and Securities for Independent Expert Reports (The 
VALMIN Code) for Australasia; 
 The Standards and Guidelines for Valuation of Mineral Properties (The 
CIMVAL Code) for Canada; and 
 The South African Code for the Reporting of Mineral Asset Valuation (The 
SAMVAL Code, 2016) for South Africa. 
Each of these codes provides guidelines for the valuation of mineral assets 
depending on the stage of development of the project.  As an example SAMVAL 
(2016) sets out the minimum standards and guidelines for reporting of mineral 
asset valuations in South Africa.  This paper suggests that in the extractive 
industries, value is usually derived from an assessment of the intrinsic value of the 
unique technical characteristics of the asset.  As such, it suggests that of three 
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recommended valuation approaches, being income, market and cost approaches, 
two valuation approaches should be used to assess the value of a mineral asset.  
However, as this research is reviewing changes to company value rather than 
resource or asset value, different mineral valuation techniques were not reviewed.  
Instead this research focussed on company value, with a range of valuation 
techniques available.   
Accurate determination of the economic value of a company is difficult, with the 
calculation based on both buyer and seller perception of the company.  For this 
reason a number of different valuation approaches have been developed, each 
with its own purpose and relevance, depending on the requirements of the 
valuation.  NAVCA (2008) split the commonly used company valuation approaches 
into three categories being asset based approach, income approach and market 
approach.  These three primary approaches each contain a number of different 
valuation methods.  
2.2.1 Asset based valuation 
Asset based valuation considers that the total value of a company can be 
determined by the difference between the company’s assets and its liabilities.  It 
is also referred to as balance sheet based valuation, since the balance sheet 
contains information on the company’s assets and liabilities.  In consideration of 
asset based valuation techniques, Fernàndez (2007) explained that whilst 
traditionally, company value lies in its balance sheet, generally the equity’s asset 
value has little bearing on its market value.  This is because this approach does not 
take into account the company’s earnings, current industry situation and future 
potential earnings, as these do not appear on the balance sheet.   
This is particularly relevant for mining companies where the primary assets are the 
individual mineral resources and mineral reserves which the company has title to.  
The market value of these, as determined by the mineral asset valuation 
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previously discussed, will not appear on the company’s balance sheet.  As such this 
asset based approach is not appropriate for mining company valuation.      
2.2.2 Income based valuation 
Income based valuation is based on the company’s expected income streams 
rather than the balance sheet.  This approach attempts to calculate all anticipated 
future earnings and economic benefits into a single amount.  This includes metrics 
such as net present value, discounted cash flow and other future earnings 
valuation calculations.  In reviewing the income based valuations, Steiger (2008) 
suggested that whilst these methods are a powerful tool for determining company 
value for capital budgeting, this approach is very vulnerable to changes in the 
underlying assumptions.  Again, this is particularly relevant for the valuation of 
mining companies, where the calculation of future income streams is dependent 
on forecasting commodity prices, something which is a potential source of 
variability.  The income approach is often used for the valuation of individual 
mineral assets, particularly as part of feasibility studies.  However, to combine 
these individual valuations into a company valuation is difficult and as such not 
appropriate for this study. 
2.2.3 Market based valuation 
Market based valuation uses the concept that the value of a business is calculated 
by determining what an investor would be willing to pay for the company.  For 
non-publically listed companies, or for the valuation of individual mining projects, 
this is done using market comparable methods.  However SAMVAL (2016, p10), 
which provides guidelines on the valuation of a mineral asset, suggests that “the 
application of certain logic in Mineral Asset Valuation, such as ‘gross in-situ value’ 
simply determined from the product of the estimate of mineral content and 
commodity price(s), is considered unacceptable and inappropriate”.  As such it is 
often difficult to determine the properties used for value calculation.  Ellis (2016) 
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researched how this comparable method can be used for mineral property 
valuation.  In doing so, the research suggested that for mineral property interests 
there are a number of constraints in this method, specifically around identifying 
suitable properties for comparison.  As such this was not considered as a valuation 
method for this study.   
For many non-public (or private) and publically listed companies the market based 
valuation approaches involve the market capitalisation of the company.  Whereas 
the asset and income based approaches attempt to calculate the intrinsic value of 
a company and can vary based on the input assumptions, the market valuation 
approaches give the value from the willing buyer, willing seller principle and 
requires that the monetary value obtainable from the sale of the company is 
determined as if in an arm’s-length transaction (SAMVAL, 2016).  This market value 
includes all underlying economic fundamentals, with investors considering the 
long-term potential of stocks to determine its value (Koller et al, 2005).  As this 
research study is focused on analysing changes to company value over time, the 
more simplistic market valuation approach is therefore used in this study.  This 
approach is more transparent, allowing the value estimated for a mining company 
to be benchmarked against other companies (Roberts, 2006).   
The market value of a company is measured in two main ways.  The simplest way 
is to calculate its market capitalisation, which is a multiple of the share price and 
the total number of outstanding shares.  However, this calculation omits a number 
of important aspects which contribute to the overall value of a company, including 
debt, cash and cash equivalents.  Bhullar & Bhatnagar (2013) suggested that a 
more appropriate measure of company value is enterprise value (EV), which 
provides a measure of the real market value of a firm as a whole business.   As 
such, EV was used in this research study as the measure of company value and 
performance over the period under review. 
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2.3 Enterprise value and its potential drivers 
Enterprise value is commonly defined as the equity value plus total debt, preferred 
stock and minority interest, minus cash and cash equivalents (Investopedia, 
2016b).  An alternate calculation for EV is the sum of the company’s market 
capitalisation and its net debt.  This is essentially the theoretical takeover price to 
buy out an entire public company, giving a much clearer picture of real value 
compared to market capitalisation.   
The equity value of a company is calculated from its market capitalisation.  This is 
the value of the company’s outstanding or issued shares which is calculated by 
multiplying the current share price by the number of outstanding shares.   Net 
debt is the total short and long term debt, minus any cash and cash equivalents.  
The reason for including any cash and cash equivalents is that these could 
theoretically be offset against any debt commitments.  These calculations were 
used to calculate the EV of the selected companies, at different points in time, 
which represents changes in company value.   
There are several factors which drive the EV of mining companies.  Bhullar & 
Bhatnagar (2013) provided similar guidelines, suggesting that EV can be improved 
by three methods: increasing sales, reducing costs and reducing capital lockup.  
Supporting this, Deloitte (2012) suggested that the most common value drivers 
can be depicted as drivers of shareholder value as shown in Figure 2.2.   
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Figure 2.2 : High level shareholder value map 
Source: Deloitte (2012) 
Based on these guidelines, a number of different metrics were selected for 
analysis as drivers of company value.  Revenue growth was analysed in terms of 
volume and price.  Operating margin was analysed using valuation multiples which 
“attempt to capture many of a firm’s operating and financial characteristics” 
(Macabacus, 2016, p1).  This is particularly important for mining companies, which 
following the boom times experienced reduced profits as they struggled to get 
escalating costs under control.  Asset efficiency, referred to in this report as capital 
efficiency, analyses how well a company uses its debt and equity portions to add 
company value.  Analysis of expectations, in terms of company strengths and 
external factors, is much more difficult to correlate to EV as single metrics.  As 
such, specific analysis of this was excluded from this study.  However, where 
relevant links to expectations were identified and are discussed in this report.    
2.3.1 Revenue drivers 
The basic calculation of revenue is price multiplied by quantity of product sold 
(volume).  For the mining industry, this is commodity production output multiplied 
by commodity price.  Thus, the two potential drivers for revenue for mining 
companies is commodity price and production output. 
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Commodity price 
The most obvious value driver of a mining stock is the price of the commodities 
produced, particularly for established mining companies (Maverick, 2015).   
However, Baurens (2010) identified that the valuation of mining companies is 
complicated because of the cyclical nature of commodity prices and that 
commodity companies are mostly price takers.  This is because most minerals, 
excluding as an example diamonds, are fungible meaning that they can be 
mutually substituted.  This means that unlike most industries where producers can 
influence the price of their products by changing quality or output, mineral 
commodity prices are dictated in the open market.  As such the resulting valuation 
varies depending on where in the price cycle that company’s output is. 
For this reason it is important to understand the commodity price cycle for the 
period under review from 2006 to 2015.  The start of the 21st century saw the end 
of the technology boom, but the start of the mining boom.  The bursting of the 
‘dot-com’ boom resulted in the 2001 US stock market crash.   Up until the 2000s, 
commodity prices have been declining since a peak in 1974 as shown in Figure 2.3.   
 
Figure 2.3 : Commodity prices in real terms (1900 – 2020) 
Source: Brahmbhatt and Canuto (2010) 
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As of 2000 non-oil commodity prices were at their lowest levels in real terms for 
the entire century.  However, this was all to change very quickly, with the rapid 
urbanisation and industrialisation of emerging economies, particularly those of 
China and India. This increased demand for most commodities, linked with limited 
supply, resulted in extraordinary increases in commodity prices.   As can be seen 
in Figure 2.3, from the start of the boom in 2001 to the onset of the GFC in late 
2008, commodity prices increased by over 250%. 
Thus by 2006, the start of the analysis period for this study, the boom in 
commodity prices was well underway.  Mining companies were continuously 
beating previous year revenue and profit outputs, and paying out growing 
dividends to investors.  The majors were constantly on the lookout for 
opportunities to expand and increase production, in many cases with little 
consideration of the costs of such expansions.   Price Waterhouse Coopers 
annually produce a mining publication which reviews global trends of the mining 
industry for the previous year.  This is primarily done by reviewing the 
performance of the top 40 mining companies and gives a very good picture of the 
changing industry and commodity cycles over the period.  The titles of these 
reports convey the sentiment of the period with the 2006 publication titled “Let 
the good times roll” (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2006).  In 2006, they reported 
that net profits for the top 40 mining companies were 1423% higher than the 2002 
equivalent (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2007).   
Nevertheless this was all about to change drastically in 2008, with the onset of the 
GFC.  In April 2008 the US government had to bail out two major financial 
institutions as a result of a sub-prime mortgage crisis.  “Like a pack of dominoes, 
most banks with large sub-prime exposures joined the solvency and liquidity 
fracas” (Baxter, 2009, p106).  As a result of this, for some commodities in a space 
of a couple of months, prices crashed to close to pre-boom times.  Figure 2.4 shows 
this crash charting indexed average annual commodity prices with the spot price 
as of the end of 2008 shown at the end.  As a result, in 2008 the market 
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capitalisation of the top 40 mining companies decreased by 62% (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, 2009). 
 
Figure 2.4 : Commodity prices indexed to 2003 
Source: Price Waterhouse Coopers (2009) 
In late 2009 and early 2010, the price of most commodities recovered to above 
pre-GFC levels and as such most companies started to recover to similar levels.  
This was relatively short lived, with the price of most commodities on a steady 
decline since the start of 2011 to the end of 2015, as shown in Figure 2.5.  As a 
result, these years have been tough for mining companies with reduced demand 
pushing prices down and companies battling with the legacy of escalating cost 
bases from the boom times.   
 
Figure 2.5 : Changes in key commodity prices since January 2011 
Source: Ernst & Young (2015) 
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Given the variable performance between mining companies, commodity price 
cannot be the sole driver of mining company value.  Widespread evidence exists 
to show that the rise and fall of company value is not just linked to commodity 
prices.  For example, the market capitalisation of the top 40 mining companies 
dropped by 37% in 2015, which is disproportionately greater than that of 
commodity prices (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2016).  The same is apparent in 
times of rising prices, for example for the first 6 months of 2016, the gold bullion 
price rose by 27.7% yet the gold equities, as displayed by the FTSE Gold Mine 
Index, increased by 110.4% (FTSE Russell, 2016).  Given this, there are obviously 
other factors that affect company value.  
In most cases a mining company’s revenue is as volatile as the price of the 
commodities it is producing.  This is because revenue is a direct multiple of price 
and production output.  As such both the commodity price and the production 
output determine company revenue and in combination were included as part of 
the analysis.    
Production output 
Whilst companies have very little control over commodity prices, they can 
influence how much they produce of each commodity.  As commodity prices 
started to increase in the early 2000s, the main focus for mining CEO’s moved from 
cutting costs and operational efficiency to “mine supply and maximising 
production” (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2006, p3).  However, the mining industry 
is unique to other industries in that mining projects have long lead times.  As such 
companies cannot react to increased demand by quickly bringing on additional 
capacity.  Consequently, the production output across the industry has been 
relatively flat.  Table 2.1 shows the annual change in production output for the top 
40 mining companies from 2007 to 2011.   
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Table 2.1: Year on year change in production output – top 40 mining companies 
Sources: Price Waterhouse Coopers (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012) 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Average 
Gold 9% -8% 7% 2% 9% 4% 
Platinum -9% 0% -4% 0% 2% -2% 
Copper 4% 1% 0% -4% 16% 3% 
Zinc 11% 2% 9% 0% -10% 2% 
Coal 6% 4% -2% 1% -1% 2% 
Iron Ore 7% 7% -3% 16% 6% 7% 
Nickel 8% -1% -11% 4% 13% 3% 
  
As can be seen whilst in some years there are relatively large jumps in production 
output, in general output is relatively flat for the mining industry.  Thus, the 
primary way mining companies increase production output is through acquisition 
of other companies and operations.  As such, changes in production output for 
each of the major mining companies was analysed as this affects total revenue of 
the group. 
2.3.2 Valuation multiples 
Krinks et al. (2011) analysed the performance of 37 top mining companies to 
understand where they created greatest returns for shareholders from 1999 to 
2009.  Their research study indicated that increases in valuation multiples was a 
major contributor to strong shareholder returns.  Their study included valuation 
multiples of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) 
multiple and EBITDA margin.   The EBITDA multiple is defined as EV divided by 
EBITDA.  Bhullar & Bhatnagar (2013) suggested that EBITDA multiple is a preferred 
valuation multiple to price on equity (P/E) as it considers debt and cash position, 
but excludes potential tax differences.   Loughran & Wellman (2010) provided 
evidence on the link between enterprise multiples, which are valuation multiples 
and stock returns, and as such should be linked to company performance.  
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The second valuation multiple, EBITDA margin, is the EBITDA divided by total 
revenue.  This shows what portion of revenue is earnings and what portion is 
operating expenses.  Essentially this measure can be used to analyse which 
companies have managed to keep costs in line with changes in revenue and which 
have been most affected by escalating costs.  In 2012 the net profit of the top 40 
mining companies was down by 49% on the previous year (Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, 2013).  Most companies bulked up when prices were high, focusing on 
expansion at all costs, and as softer commodity prices hit, the high costs remained 
eroding operating profits.  Price Waterhouse Cooper (2015) described the 
importance of cost reduction for company value, highlighting how many 
companies lost cost efficiency, which is potentially destroying company value.   
2.3.3 Capital management and efficiency 
Capital management and efficiency can be defined as “the prudent management 
of the capital required to support a business and the use of the resulting free cash 
flows” (Krinks et al, 2011, p19).  The authors further said that a large percentage 
of the total shareholder returns for mining companies from 1999 to 2009 can be 
attributed to effective and efficient capital management.  Further to this, Deloitte 
(2016b) provided details of the top 10 issues facing mining companies going 
forward.  One of the issues they discussed is industry debt burdens, which had 
“spiralled out of control” having a major effect on the value of a company.  By 
2015, net debt ratios for the top 40 mining companies had risen to the highest 
levels since the early 2000s and leverage was increasingly stretching the balance 
sheets of many of the major mining houses (Ernst & Young, 2015).  Whilst this is 
an industry-wide issue, the extent of the issue varies significantly among 
companies.    
There are three common measures of capital efficiency being gearing ratio, net 
debt to EBITDA and return on capital employed (ROCE).  Gearing ratio is a measure 
of a portion of the company’s assets (debt plus equity) which is debt.  Examining 
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this can provide an indication of the company’s financial strength, gauging the 
capacity of corporates to absorb unexpected financial shocks (Ernst & Young, 
2015).  In general, if the gearing ratio is too high, it is a sign that a company may 
be in financial distress and unable to pay debtors.  Increasing gearing means the 
financial risk associated with that company is also increasing.   
The second capital management measure which is commonly used, and suggested 
by Price Waterhouse Coopers (2016) as a convent applied by lenders is the net 
debt to EBITDA.  The same report suggested that ratios above four should cause 
alarm to management and investors and as a benchmark the 2014 and 2015 
averages across the top 40 mining companies were 1.52 and 2.46, respectively.  
Net debt to EBITDA is an important measure as it shows the company’s ability to 
pay back its debt.  The higher the number, the more difficult it could be for the 
company to pay off its debt, or be able to take on any additional debt required to 
grow the business.  As this figure is essentially a measure of how many years 
EBITDA is required to pay off the company’s debt, this value must only be reviewed 
on an annual year-end basis.  As can be seen in Figure 2.6, which shows the above 
measures for 88 listed mining companies, both of these values increased 
significantly over the 15 year period from 2000 to 2014, potentially indicating a 
major driver to company value over the period. 
 
Figure 2.6 : Growing net debt in the mining industry – analysis of 88 listed mining 
companies 
Source: Ernst & Young (2015) 
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The third capital management value driver is ROCE.  ROCE is a measure of the 
company’s profitability compared to the capital employed to achieve this profit.  
This is calculated by dividing the earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) by the 
capital employed.  The capital employed is commonly defined as the total assets 
less the current liabilities.  The higher the ROCE, the more efficient the company’s 
use of available capital.  It has been proven that the market rewards firms that can 
get good returns on the capital they employ in their business, by valuing them at 
a higher premium than their peers (Pattabiraman, 2013).  ROCE is particularly 
useful when comparing performance of companies in capital intensive industries 
(Damodaran, 2007), something which the mining industry most definitely is.  As a 
benchmark for the mining industry, when Mark Cutifani joined Anglo American as 
the CEO in 2013 he committed to achieving a ROCE of 15%, however with declining 
commodity prices this target has slipped to a range between 5 – 15% between 
2013 and 2016 (Wilson, 2016).   
2.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter has introduced the theory of company value.  In order to determine 
the company value a number of different valuation approaches are used including 
the asset based approach, income approach and market approach.  For the 
purpose of this study the market based approach was considered the most 
appropriate because of its limited reliance on input assumptions and its suitability 
for comparing companies.  Within this approach, existing literature suggests that 
the most appropriate measure of company value is EV.  Research also shows that 
sales, costs and capital lockup are the main drivers of EV.  These can be reclassified 
into three main categories: revenue drivers, valuation multiples and capital 
management and efficiency drivers.  The main drivers of revenue were identified 
as commodity price and production output.  EBITDA multiple and EBITDA margin 
are the two main valuation multiple drivers.  Finally, gearing ratio, net debt to 
EBITDA and ROCE are the main capital efficiency drivers.  All of these drivers 
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ultimately influence the EV of companies and were therefore selected as the value 
drivers for this research study.  
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3 RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter discusses the research methods and analytical techniques used.  The 
data required to calculate EV and identified potential value drivers was obtained 
from the public domain using company annual reports, half yearly reports and 
quarterly production reports.  Where the required values were not directly 
reported they were estimated from available data.  All measures were indexed 
back to the 31st December 2005.  The final date for analysis was the 31st December 
2015 which represents a 10 year period and the position of the company as of the 
start of 2016.   
3.2 Data that was analysed and its sources 
3.2.1 Enterprise value 
As mentioned in the literature review, EV was used as the measure of company 
value for this study.  EV was not specifically reported in the annual financials by 
any of the companies, so it was calculated from reported metrics.  As previously 
defined, EV can be calculated as net debt plus market capitalisation.  Net debt was 
reported by some companies, but in cases where it was not reported it was 
calculated as the sum of both short and long term debt minus cash and cash 
equivalents.  Market capitalisation is the current share price multiplied by the 
number of issued shares at the end of the period.  The current share price as of 
the close of each period was sourced from Yahoo Finance for each company 
(Yahoo Finance, 2016a – d).  The total number of shares issued and outstanding is 
reported as part of the changes in stockholders equity in both annual and semi-
annual reports.  For all companies the share prices from the primary listing was 
used, being: 
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 Anglo American - London Stock Exchange; 
 BHP Billiton - Australian Stock Exchange; 
 Rio Tinto - London Stock Exchange; and 
 CVRD-Vale - New York Stock Exchange.   
As the reporting currency for all companies is United States Dollars (USD), those 
stocks that are reported in Great British Pounds (GBP) and Australian Dollars (AUD) 
were converted to USD using the month average exchange rate for that currency.  
These exchange rates were sourced on a monthly average from FXtop (2016) for 
the period from January 2006 to December 2015.  EV was calculated on a 6 month 
interval and indexed back to the 31st December 2005. 
Whilst share price is one of the main derivatives of EV, specific analysis of the 
drivers of share price were not included in this study.  Instead the focus was on 
the main economic drivers of EV, of which share price is a subset. 
3.2.2 Production output 
The two primary drivers which were analysed for their effect on revenue was 
production output and commodity price.  An increase or decrease of production 
output across all commodities, should show the growth or contraction of a 
company respectively.  In order to analyse this, the quarterly production output 
for each of the primary commodities segments was indexed to the quarterly 
production for the last quarter of 2005.  This was compared to the indexed EV for 
the same period, in order to identify trends.  Thus, if a company is producing seven 
main commodities in Quarter 4 (Q4) 2005, then the indexed output for the start 
of the analysis is seven.  Each commodity is then indexed quarter on quarter back 
to Q4 2005 output and plotted on a stacked area graph.  A hypothetical example 
of this calculation is shown in Table 3.1 and then plotted in Figure 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Hypothetical production output and indexing 
 Q4 2005 Q1 2006 Q2 2006 Q3 2006 
Production Indexed Production Indexed Production Indexed Production Indexed 
Gold 900 (oz) 1 1200 (oz) 1.3 700 (oz) 0.8 500 (oz) 0.6 
Coal 25 (Mt) 1 15 (Mt) 0.6 20 (Mt) 0.8 30 (Mt) 1.2 
Copper 200,000 (t) 1 400,000 (t) 2.0 300,000 (t) 1.5 300,000 (t) 1.5 
Iron Ore 7 (Mt) 1 7 (Mt) 1.0 8 (Mt) 1.1 3 (Mt) 0.4 
 
 
Figure 3.1 : Stacked area graph of hypothetical production output 
In Figure 3.1 the company was producing from four commodity segments 
represented by gold, coal, copper and iron ore.  As an example of the analysis that 
could occur on this data: 
 Gold output for the first quarter of 2006 increased, however for the next 
two periods it decreased to eventually be almost half the production of Q4 
2005; 
 Coal output reduced, then started to increase by Q3 2006; 
 Copper output increased substantially throughout all periods;   
 Iron ore remained relatively flat with a big drop in output for Q3 2006; and 
 Total commodity output increased in early 2006 but decreased by Q3 2006. 
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This trend was then plotted against EV to see if changes in production output 
drove company value.  In order to consider both commodity price and production 
output for each of the companies, both were indexed to Q4 2005 in order to 
analyse any trends.  However, in the case of CVRD-Vale, which expanded its 
business to include additional commodity segments after 2005, indexing all 
production output back to Q4 2005 was not possible.  Thus it was indexed to the 
first quarter (Q1, 2010) where it produced the full range of commodity segments.  
The same analysis to EV was done. 
The production per commodity for each company was available from the quarterly 
production reports.  Since the analysis of production output and commodity prices 
starts with the revenue contribution for each commodity from 2005, commodities 
were grouped together as per the company segments.  Appendix 7.1 to Appendix 
7.4 provide a summary of how each company has broken down various 
commodities into segments.  As some segments include a basket of different 
commodities, the primary commodity or commodity which contributed the most 
to segment revenue was selected for production and pricing analysis.  Where no 
commodity is produced, for example in the “other” segment, no production 
analysis was done.  Table 3.2 summarises the different segments for each 
company, detailing the primary commodity, which was analysed for changes in 
production output.   
All production values were indexed back to the Q4 2005 output.  However, to 
ensure that this quarter was not abnormal and did not misrepresent the changes 
in production output, the total production for 2005 for each commodity was 
divided by four to get the average quarterly production for 2005.   
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Table 3.2 : Summary of primary commodity analysed per company sector 
Company Segment Primary commodity analysed 
Anglo American 
Platinum Refined platinum 
Gold Gold 
Diamonds Diamonds  
Coal Total coal  
Copper Copper  
Nickel, niobium & mineral sands Nickel  
Iron ore & manganese Total iron ore including lump 
and fines 
Other mining, industrial & 
corporate 
No  analysis 
BHP Billiton 
Petroleum & potash Total petroleum  
Aluminium, manganese & nickel Aluminium  
Base metals Copper   
Diamonds and speciality 
productions 
Diamonds 
Iron ore Iron ore  
Metallurgical coal Metallurgical coal  
Energy coal Energy (thermal) coal  
Rio Tinto 
Aluminium Aluminium  
Iron ore Iron ore 
Diamonds & industrial minerals Titanium dioxide  
Copper Copper  
Energy Thermal coal 
CVRD-Vale 
Ferrous metals Iron ore 
Coal Thermal coal 
Base metals Nickel 
Copper Copper 
Fertilizers Phosphate rock 
Aluminium Bauxite 
Logistics & others No analysis 
 
3.2.3 Commodity prices 
The second driver for revenue alongside production is the commodity price.  The 
specific commodity price for each of the company segments is analysed in the 
revenue analysis.  A more general analysis, using the trends of all the major 
commodities was undertaken to determine if there was any link to EV.  This looked 
at the different baskets of commodities, all indexed back to the average price in 
2005.  The majority of commodity prices were collected from the World Bank 
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commodity price “pink sheet” (World Bank, 2016).  This data file included prices 
for the following: 
 Copper –$/metric tonne; 
 Nickel - $/metric tonne; 
 Aluminium - $/metric tonne; 
 Platinum - $/troy ounce; 
 Gold - $/troy ounce; 
 Iron ore - $/dry metric tonne unit (dmtu).  The cost and freight (cfr) price 
was used which means that the seller arranges for sea carriage of the 
product to the required port.  Since indexed pricing is being used, then this 
price is suitable for all companies;   
 Phosphate rock - $/metric tonne; 
 Thermal coal – $/metric tonne.  Two different prices are provided for 
thermal coal being Australia and South Africa.  The Australian price is a free 
on board (FOB) price to Newcastle & Port Kembla.  For South Africa it is 
FOB to Richards Bay Coal Terminal (RBCT).  The Australian coal is of a 
slightly higher energy rating and as such attracts a slightly higher price.  
Both prices track fairly closely and since the four companies analysed are 
exposed more to Australian production, the Australian thermal coal price 
was used; and 
 Crude Oil - $/barrel ($/bbl). As reported by the World Bank the price is the 
equally weighted average of crude oil Brent, crude oil Dubai and crude oil 
US West Texas Intermediate (WTI). 
The World Bank only reports thermal coal prices however as many of the mining 
companies also produce metallurgical/coking coal this price was also required for 
the analysis.   Since the majority of the production of metallurgical/coking coal is 
from Australia, the hard coking coal (HCC) spot FOB Australia price was used.  This 
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is the hard coking coal, free on board price and available from The Steel Index 
(2016).   
Due to the specific nature of the diamond industry, diamond prices are not 
reported on the World Bank report or on commodity pricing forums.  This is 
because diamonds are not traded as a bulk commodity and that they are non-
fungible which means no two diamond carats are the same.  As such their price is 
dependent on the unique characteristics of each stone as characterised by the four 
c’s being colour, clarity, cut and carats.  Thus, for the purpose of this analysis, the 
diamond pricing trends index was used.  This index, published by a group called 
the Diamond Search Engine, is a representation of the current market pricing for 
diamonds.  This is the average retail price per carat of loose diamonds from 
jewellers around the world (DiamondsSearchEngine, 2016).  Whilst this is not the 
realised price that the mining company would have received for the diamonds 
produced, it should represent the trends in changes in pricing which is appropriate 
when indexing back to the Q4 2005 pricing.     
3.2.4 Revenue 
To measure how changes to both commodity price and commodity production 
output would have affected revenue on a quarter by quarter basis the following 
measures were developed: 
1) Calculate the percentage that each commodity segment contributed to 
revenue for 2005 for each company (or in the case of CVRD-Vale 2010).  
This is calculated by taking the total reported revenue for that sector and 
dividing by the total revenue for the company.  For example platinum 11%, 
gold 8%, etc.;   
2) Calculate the indexed average quarterly commodity price compared to Q4 
of 2005 (or in the case of CVRD-Vale Q1 2010); and  
3) Multiply the percentage revenue by the indexed production by the indexed 
commodity price.   
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This output represents the estimated changes to revenue through changes in 
commodity price and production.  A hypothetical example of this calculation, using 
hypothetical data, is shown in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4.   
Table 3.3 : Hypothetical price and production data 
 2005 
Revenue 
2005 Q4 
Commodity 
price 
2006 Q1 
Commodity 
price 
2005 Q4 
Production 
2006 Q1 
Production 
Gold $US25M $   478 $   591 1,500 1,500 
Copper $US25M $  1.90 $  2.76 150,000 100,000 
Platinum $US25M $   944 $ 1,107 700 700 
Iron Ore $US25M $     69 $    68 7.8 9.5 
 
Table 3.4 : Hypothetical commodity price, production and revenue change 
 % Revenue 
contribution 
2006 Q1 Indexed 
commodity price 
2006 Q1 Indexed 
production 
2006 Q1 
Theoretical 
indexed revenue 
Gold 25% 1.24 1.00 31% 
Copper 25% 1.45 0.67 24% 
Platinum 25% 1.17 1.00 29% 
Iron Ore 25% 0.99 1.22 30% 
Total 100%   115% 
 
As can be seen in Figure 3.2 through the hypothetical example above, the total 
revenue produced by the company should have increased.  Copper, which had the 
greatest increase in price actually decreased in revenue due to reduced 
production.  Iron ore had increased revenue however this was due to production 
rather than commodity price.  The company could have had a much higher 
revenue by increasing production in those commodities where the price increased 
the most (gold and copper) and focused less on the commodities where the price 
remained relatively flat or decreased (iron ore).   
 Page 39 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 : Hypothetical commodity price and production analysis 
Where a company had significant revenue contribution from non-commodity 
sectors, for example CVRD-Vale’s logistics business, the annual percentage 
contribution to revenue was extracted from the annual financial reports and this 
figure was used for each quarter of the year.   
3.2.5 Valuation multiples 
The two valuation multiples which were analysed were EBITDA multiple and 
EBITDA margin.  EBITDA was reported by all companies on both an annual and 
semi-annual basis.  EBITDA multiple is measured on an annual basis by dividing the 
year-end EV by the total 12 month EBITDA.  EBITDA margin is a comparison of 
revenue to EBITDA and as such it can be measured on a semi-annual basis for a 6 
month period.  Since all companies report EBITDA and revenue in their annual 
reports for a period of 12 months, the first half results were subtracted from the 
full year results to get the second half value.  Both values were plotted against EV 
to determine if there was any correlation as a driver for company value.  
All the required financial data was collected from company annual and interim 
reports.  Where the required value was not directly reported, it was estimated 
through calculations based on other available data.  All companies report annual 
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results which cover the period of 12 months and interim results which cover the 
first 6 months of the year.  For EBITDA margin, which is measured semi-annually, 
the second quarter EBITDA was calculated by taking the annual results and 
subtracting the first half yearly EBITDA.  This was the same approach used for the 
revenue calculation.   
3.2.6 Capital management and efficiency 
The three capital management and efficiency drivers analysed were gearing ratio, 
debt to EBITDA and ROCE.  In the first two calculations, debt is the numerator.  For 
this study since EV is being used as the value measure and uses net debt rather 
than gross debt, net debt was used for all calculations.  Net debt is either reported 
in the annual reports on the balance sheet or was calculated by subtracting all cash 
and cash equivalents from gross debt. 
Gearing ratio is calculated by dividing net debt by total capital.  In some annual 
and interim reports companies reported gearing ratios.  Where it was not reported 
it was calculated by dividing the net debt by the total capital.  Total capital is 
calculated by adding the net debt and the equity attributable to shareholders.  The 
gearing ratio was calculated on a semi-annual basis.   
Debt to EBITDA is a company’s ability to pay off debt and is a comparative measure 
of the approximate number of years it would take a company to pay off all its debt.  
As such this should only be measured annually, using the full year’s earnings.  
EBITDA was reported by all companies in their annual reports. 
Finally, ROCE is a measure of the efficiency of a company’s assets to generate 
profit.  As such it is calculated by dividing the company’s EBIT by the capital 
employed.  EBIT is reported on company reports often as operating profit, and 
shows the company profits generated from operations.  It can also be derived from 
net income by adding back interest and taxes.  Capital employed refers to the total 
assets of a company less any current liabilities, both of which are reported on the 
 Page 41 
 
 
company’s balance sheet.  Whilst many companies report ROCE on their interim 
results, the EBIT for the period is annualised or based on the full previous 12 
months performance data (Anglo American, 2016b).  As such ROCE was calculated 
annually.   
3.2.7 Potential value drivers 
In summary Table 3.5 shows the value drivers analysed to determine the key 
drivers for mining company EV.  Data on each of these was collected for the four 
mining companies to determine which one had the biggest influence on company 
value. 
Table 3.5 : Summary of potential value drivers 
Production output 
Quarterly change in production output for each 
commodity since Q4 2005. Measured quarterly. 
Commodity Price 
Grouped baskets of similar commodities.  Measured 
monthly.  
Commodity exposure 
Combination of production output change and 
commodity price to estimate revenue change since 
Q4 2005.  Measured quarterly. 
EBITDA multiple 
A measure of EV to EBITDA.  Measures the value of 
the company compared to earnings. Measured 
annually. 
EBITDA margin 
A measure of the EBITDA to revenue.  Measures the 
portion of earnings which is profits compared to 
operating costs.  Measured semi-annually. 
Gearing ratio 
Ratio of net debt to sum of debt plus equity.  
Measures the company financial strength.  
Measured semi-annually. 
Debt to EBITDA 
Net debt divided by EBITDA.  Measures the 
company’s ability to pay back debt.  Measured 
annually. 
Return  on capital employed 
(ROCE) 
EBIT divided by capital employed. It is a measure of 
efficiency of a company’s use of available capital.  
Measured annually. 
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3.3 Data analysis process 
All required data was collected and calculations were done to get the final outputs.  
All values were then indexed back to the Q4 2005 figure, in order to analyse and 
determine any trends and correlations between the potential value drivers and 
EV.  For the production output and commodity price analysis a stacked area graph 
was used.  For all other drivers linear graphs of both the possible value driver and 
EV were used as summarised in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6 : Summary of potential value drivers and analysis approaches 
Potential value driver Graph type Correlation analysis 
possible 
Production Stacked area No 
Theoretical revenue Stacked area (of %) No 
EBITDA multiple Linear Yes 
EBITDA margin Linear Yes 
Gearing ratio Linear Yes 
Debt to EBITDA Linear Yes 
Return  on Capital 
Employed 
Linear Yes 
 
From the stacked area graph, potential value drivers for each company were 
visually observed based on the trend of driver versus EV.  For the linear graphs a 
correlation coefficient analysis using the Microsoft Excel Pearson functionality was 
done.  The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient is the most common 
method for determining a correlation between two variables.  It is most relevant 
when analysing a linear relationship between variables, which all of the above 
should be.  As summarised by Laerd Statistics (2016), the Pearson correlation 
coefficient, r, can be a range of values from -1 to +1.  A value of 0 indicates no 
correlation between variables, with >0 a positive correlation and <0 a negative 
correlation.  The closer the value is to +1 or -1, the stronger the correlation and 
thus, the relationship between the variables.  The same reference suggests the 
guidelines when interpreting the Pearson correlation coefficient as per Table 3.7. 
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Table 3.7 : Pearson correlation guidelines 
Source: Laerd Statistics (2016) 
Strength of 
association 
Pearson correlation value 
Positive Negative 
Low 0.1 to 0.3 -0.1 to -0.3 
Medium 0.3 to 0.5 -0.3 to -0.5 
High 0.5 to 1.0 -0.5 to -1.0 
 
As such the potential value drivers were analysed for correlation.  Further to this, 
analysis and discussion was done for any significant changes in any of the value 
drivers, or where the drivers were at irregular levels.  This formed part of the 
individual analysis and discussion of each company.   
3.4 Chapter summary 
A total of eight different potential value drivers were selected for analysis to 
review their influence on EV.  These were split into three different categories being 
revenue drivers, valuations multiples and capital management and efficiency 
ratios.  The required data for each company was collected from annual and interim 
financial reports and quarterly production reports.  Commodity prices for the 
period of investigation were also collected.  All data was then indexed back to Q4 
2005 in order to be able to track trends and determine correlation between the 
different drivers and enterprise value.  A statistical technique, the Pearson 
correlation coefficient, was then used to determine the strength of correlation 
between the value drivers and EV.  All data is presented and analysed in the next 
chapter.  
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4 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
4.1 Chapter overview 
This chapter presents and analyses the results for company value and the different 
potential value drivers.  EV is first analysed to identify the differing company 
performance over the period 2006 to 2015.  Then each of the potential value 
drivers is presented and analysed, discussing both the correlation to EV and any 
trends between the different companies and possible effects on company value.  
Finally, considering all four companies, the key value drivers are selected and 
discussed. 
4.2 Variation in company performance 
Figure 4.1 shows a comparison of company value over the 10 year period from 
2006 to 2015, highlighting the difference in performance for the four companies 
over this period.  The figure shows EV for each of the companies, indexed to 31st 
December 2005 using data gathered from company reports shown in Appendix 7.5 
to Appendix 7.8.  CVRD-Vale was indexed to 30th June 2006 due to a share split in 
May 2006 which had a major effect on EV. 
 
Figure 4.1 : Enterprise value for the four companies, 2006 – 2015  
Sources : Anglo American (2006 – 2016), BHP Billiton (2005 – 2015),  
South 32 (2015), Rio Tinto (2006 – 2016a) & Vale (2006 – 2016)  
 
 Page 45 
 
 
It is clear from Figure 4.1 that of the four companies, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto 
have performed significantly better than the other two over the 10 year period.  
From the graph it can be seen that the 10 years can be split into four distinct 
periods, primarily driven by price cycles as described in Section 2.3.1.  The first 
period, from the start of 2006 to June 2008 was the tail end of the commodities 
boom which saw commodity prices rise to previously unseen levels.  All four 
companies increased in value leading up to mid-2008 as the demand for 
commodities continued to push prices up.  Between September 2007 and 
December 2008 Rio Tinto was by far the best performer increasing company value 
by almost three times from the start of 2006.  This is in comparison to BHP Billiton 
which doubled in value and Anglo American and CVRD-Vale which were both 
around 50% higher over the same period.  It appears that Rio Tinto’s success over 
this period, something which is discussed later in this report, positioned it in good 
stead to be able to handle the drop in prices from June 2008. 
Then came a six month period (from June 2008 to December 2008) of rapidly 
declining prices with the onset of the GFC.  As a result of this Anglo American, Rio 
Tinto and CVRD-Vale were affected the most with a 60% drop in value, whereas 
BHP Billiton was closer to 50%.  Given Rio Tinto’s and BHP Billiton’s higher bases 
from value added pre-GFC, this meant they returned to EV’s on par with their 2006 
level.  Anglo American and CVRD-Vale were below their 2006 values.  This differing 
performance is analysed and discussed later in this report. 
This was followed by the recovery of prices and as such company value from 
December 2008 to December 2010.  If the EV is rebased to December 2008 as 
shown in Figure 4.2, CVRD-Vale significantly outperformed the other companies 
to the end of 2010.  BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto had very similar performance from 
2008 through to the end of 2015, whilst Anglo American underperformed 
compared to its competitors during the same period.    
 Page 46 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 : Enterprise value for the four companies, 2008 – 2015  
Sources : Anglo American (2009 – 2016), BHP Billiton (2008 – 2015),  
South 32 (2015), Rio Tinto (2009 – 2016) & Vale (2009 – 2016)  
 
The final period of analysis, from June 2011 to the end of 2015 saw declining EVs 
for all companies.  It is this period which highlights a distinct difference between 
the companies which have increased in value from 2006 to 2015 and those which 
have lost value.  By again changing the indexed period to June 2011, as shown in 
Figure 4.3, it is clear that BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, which lost only 40% of their 
EVs, performed much better than Anglo American and CVRD-Vale which lost close 
to 60%. 
 
Figure 4.3 : Enterprise value for the four companies, 2011 – 2015  
Sources : Anglo American (2012– 2016), BHP Billiton (2011 – 2015),  
South 32 (2015), Rio Tinto (2012 – 2016) & Vale (2012 – 2016)  
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Analysis of EV for the four companies over the 10 year period has shown the 
following variable performance: 
 Rio Tinto significantly outperformed the other companies from 2007 to 
2008; 
 Anglo American and CVRD-Vale underperformed from 2006 to 2008; 
 BHP Billiton was the least affected by the 2008 onset of the GFC; 
 CVRD-Vale had the best recovery of EV from 2008 to the end of 2010; 
 Anglo American had the worst recovery of EV from 2008 to the end of 2010 
and then a similar poor performance to end of 2015; and 
 BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto significantly outperformed Anglo American and 
CVRD-Vale from mid-2011 to the end of 2015. 
Explanation of this difference in performance done in later sections of this study 
should identify the key drivers for mining company value.   
4.3 Production output 
The production output for each company was plotted on a stacked area graph to 
show the cumulative output from the different commodity segments per quarter 
as shown in Figure 4.4 to Figure 4.7.  The input data for these graphs is shown in 
Appendix 7.9 to Appendix 7.12 respectively.  Each commodity segment is indexed 
back to Q4 2005, except for CVRD-Vale which only started producing from all 
commodity segments in March 2010, and as such is indexed to Q1 2010.   
4.3.1 Anglo American’s indexed production output 
Figure 4.4 shows Anglo American’s indexed production output using input data 
from Appendix 7.9.  The company was producing from seven commodity segments 
ceasing gold production at the end of 2007 with the sale of AngloGold Ashanti as 
mentioned in Section 1.7.1.   
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Figure 4.4 : Anglo American’s indexed production and EV 
Sources : Anglo American (2006 – 2016) 
Throughout the 10 year period Anglo American’s copper output remained 
relatively flat as the company maintained sustainable assets.  Iron ore output 
increased by approximately 150% - 180% on the 2005 production as a result of 
increased output from the Kumba operations and ramping up of production from 
Minas Rio from late 2014.  Coal output has remained relatively stable except at 
the start of 2011 due to severe flooding of operations in Australia.   Platinum 
output has been relatively stable for the entire 10 year period, with only a major 
drop in output in Q1 and Q2 2014 where production dropped almost 40% as a 
result of a major strike action in the platinum sector.  However, diamond 
production has been turbulent, with producers attempting to control prices by 
limiting supply when demand was low.  As such production was reduced 
significantly as a result of lower demand in early 2009, only returning to 80% of 
the 2005 output and then dropping again in 2012 returning to 70% of the 2005 
output.  The year 2015 saw a steady drop in diamond production as demand and 
as such prices continued to fall.  The company’s base metal segment, represented 
by nickel production, had the biggest production increase almost doubling in 
output over the 10 year period.  Thus for the calendar year 2015, in contrast to 10 
years earlier, Anglo American produced approximately 10% more copper, 25% 
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more nickel, 70% more iron ore, 30% more coal but 10% less platinum and 40% 
less diamonds.   
In comparing Anglo American’s production output for each commodity sector 
against the company’s EV, it would appear there is a weak correlation between 
the two.  In fact, from 2012 as the company tried to react to decreasing prices by 
increasing production output, EV continued to decrease.  This would suggest from 
the analysis of Anglo American, that production output is not a driver of EV.   
4.3.2 BHP Billiton’s indexed production output 
Figure 4.5 shows the changes in production output for BHP Billiton, which like 
Anglo American was also producing from seven commodity segments.  The input 
data for this figure is shown in Appendix 7.10.   
 
Figure 4.5 : BHP Billiton’s indexed production and EV 
Source : BHP Billiton (2005 – 2015) & South 32 (2015) 
In contrast to Anglo American’s production output, shown previously in Figure 4.4, 
it appears that BHP Billiton’s production output has been much more stable and 
significantly grown in some commodity sectors.  Unlike any of the other 
commodity companies, BHP Billiton has a large petroleum segment which has 
gradually grown over the 10 years to produce double the output in 2015 compared 
to 2005.  Similarly BHP Billiton’s base metal segment (represented by copper 
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output) and iron ore segments have also grown.  Its base metal production was up 
by 25% at the end of the 10 year period, with its iron ore segment producing 
almost 250% of the 2005 output.  Diamonds formed a small sector of BHP Billiton’s 
business with declining production from mid-2010 to when the business was sold 
at the end of 2012. It is only the energy coal and aluminium sectors which have 
contracted slightly, down by around 20% by 2015 on the 2005 production.  As with 
the Anglo American comparison, there appears to be little correlation between 
BHP Billiton’s EV and production output.  Even as production has been increasing 
from 2011 to 2015, EV continued to decline with declining prices.  This again shows 
that production output did not drive EV for the period under consideration.   
4.3.3 Rio Tinto’s indexed production output 
In comparison to BHP Billiton and Anglo American, Rio Tinto was only producing 
from five different commodity sectors as of 2005, as shown in Figure 4.6.  This 
figure is based on input data from Appendix 7.11. 
 
Figure 4.6 : Rio Tinto’s indexed production and EV 
Source : Rio Tinto (2006 – 2016a) 
Rio Tinto’s copper output has remained relatively flat over the period, contracting 
slightly for the last five years of the period.  The company’s energy sector is 
represented by thermal coal output from both the USA and Australia.  In 2005 
approximately 85% of Rio Tinto’s thermal coal output was from the USA.  This 
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dropped by 50% at the end of 2009 with a 50% initial public offering of its US 
thermal coal operations which were operated by Cloud Peak Energy Inc (Rio Tinto, 
2009).  The following year, in 2010, the company fully divested from Cloud Peak 
Energy Inc (Rio Tinto, 2010) resulting in Australia being the only source of its 
thermal coal production.  As such from Q1 2011 total thermal coal production for 
the company was 15% of the 2005 output, with production remaining relatively 
flat following this.  Diamond production, like Anglo American’s output, is linked 
closely to demand requirements thus reducing short term supply in line with 
demand.  Rio Tinto experienced a steady increase in iron ore production from early 
2009 to doubling its 2005 output by the end of 2015.   
The biggest change in production for the company was the increase in aluminium 
production in 2007.  This jump in aluminium output was as a result of Rio Tinto’s 
acquisition of Alcan to become the world’s biggest aluminium producer.  As a 
result of this transaction its quarterly production output increased over four times 
and has remained fairly stable for the remainder of the 10 years analysed.  EV 
jumped by almost 300% with the acquisition of Alcan and the increased aluminium 
production.  However, it would appear that as soon as prices dropped in 2008, EV 
dropped as quickly, returning to close to the 2005 levels by the end of 2008.  This 
would suggest that whilst the rapid increase in production as a result of an 
acquisition increased EV, declining commodity prices can have a similar negative 
effect on EV.  As such, commodity prices are analysed in a later section.   
4.3.4 CVRD-Vale’s indexed production output 
Figure 4.7 shows CVRD-Vale’s indexed production output and EV.  The input data 
used in this figure is shown in Appendix 7.12.   
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Figure 4.7 : CVRD-Vale’s indexed production and EV 
Source : Vale (2006 – 2016)  
At the end of 2005 CVRD-Vale was primarily an iron ore producer with some 
copper assets.  Following a strategic decision from 2006 to become a global 
diversified miner, between 2006 and 2010 the company added coal, nickel, 
fertilizer and bauxite segments to its business.  Whilst production dropped in all 
of these sectors following the GFC, after this it increased until another drop at the 
end of 2010.  Following this the company divested from bauxite however the other 
segments continued to grow from 2011 to 2015.  Throughout the 10 year period, 
iron ore production remained relatively flat, with the diversification to other 
commodities adding onto this stable iron ore base.  In comparing the production 
output and EV, it would appear that production output alone did not affect EV.   
4.3.5 Correlation of production output to EV 
The Pearson correlation coefficient of production output against EV is shown in 
Table 4.1 obtained from data in Appendix 7.9 to Appendix 7.12.  These values 
confirm the inconsistent correlation that was observed in Figure 4.4  to Figure 4.7. 
Table 4.1 : Pearson correlation coefficients of production output against EV 
Anglo American BHP Billiton Rio Tinto CVRD-Vale 
-0.4 0.2 0.6 -0.4 
Medium (-) Low (+) High (+) Medium (-) 
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As can be seen from the Pearson correlation coefficients for production output 
against EV, there is weak correlation between production output and EV, except 
for Rio Tinto’s anomaly associated with the acquisition of Alcan.  This is because 
analysis of production provides no link to the economic factors associated with the 
extraction and sale of commodities.  Increasing production in a commodity which 
has declining prices and high extractive costs can destroy value and is not 
represented in this metric.  This lack of correlation can most clearly be seen in mid-
2008, when there was little change in production for all companies, yet the 
company values dropped significantly for all companies.  Rio Tinto was the only 
company with a high correlation possibly as a result of the increase in aluminium 
production as a result of the acquisition of Alcan which also resulted in a similar 
increase in EV.  The only other correlation which can be observed is that changes 
to production appear to lag changes to EV.  This would be expected as when a 
company is doing well, and the EV increases, the reaction is to increase production.  
Similarly when a company is not doing well, it reduces production in an attempt 
to cut costs.  As such, analysis purely of production was determined not to be a 
driver of company value as it does not take into account the economic factors 
associated with this production.  However, the production output of each sector 
was considered in the revenue calculation, as discussed in a later section of this 
study.  Commodity price was also analysed to find if price influences EV. 
4.4 Commodity price 
As discussed previously in detail in Section 2.3.1, commodity prices fluctuated 
throughout the 10 year period.  Appendix 7.13 to Appendix 7.15 show the indexed 
commodity price for the major commodities over the 10 years analysed.  These 
graphs have been split into metal prices, bulk commodity prices and fertilizer 
prices, with the three segments showing slightly different trends over the period.  
From this it is clear that the commodities can be split into four main baskets, each 
displaying similar trends.  These baskets are gold, bulks and energy, metals and 
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diamonds as shown in Figure 4.8.  The bulks and energy basket was calculated by 
taking the average of the iron ore, hard coking coal, thermal coal and crude oil 
prices.  The metals basket included copper, nickel, aluminium and platinum.   The 
fertilizer price which is represented by the phosphate rock price is not shown on 
the graphs as it is not a key commodity and is a small contributor to CVRD-Vale’s 
revenue.  All prices were indexed back to the average price for the 2005 calendar 
year.   
 
Figure 4.8 : Indexed baskets of commodity prices 
Source : World Bank (2016) 
From Figure 4.8 it is clear that the bulks and energy sector experienced the biggest 
rise in pricing from 2006 to 2008 but, were similarly the hardest hit in 2008 due to 
the GFC.  This sector also suffered the biggest decline in price from 2010 to 2015.  
The metals sector, which includes platinum, was similar to gold in doubling its 
price from 2006 to 2008.  However, when gold only dropped by around 20% with 
the onset of the GFC, metal prices halved.  The post GFC recovery of all the sectors 
has been similar, however it is clear that those companies exposed to gold mining 
have fared better than the others.  Similarly those exposed to bulks and energy, 
particularly iron ore and coal, should have had better earnings up until 2012 
though they have been the hardest hit with declining prices from 2012 to 2015.   
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Of the companies analysed, only Anglo American and BHP Billiton had some 
exposure to gold.  Anglo American sold out of the gold sector in 2007 and BHP 
Billiton’s gold is an offtake product from its Olympic Dam operation.  As such these 
four companies were not able to capitalise on the rising gold price post the GFC.  
Diamonds made a very small contribution to Anglo American’s and Rio Tinto’s 
revenue streams so does not have a big influence on the two companies’ total 
revenue.  Thus for most companies their revenue stream is primarily dependent 
on different exposure and production in the bulks and energy sector and metals 
segment, with this to be discussed for each company in the next section. 
4.5 Commodity price and production output mix 
Revenue was analysed using a combination of production output and commodity 
prices for each quarter.  In essence this represents the changes in revenue 
generated by the commodities portion of each of the companies.  The results were 
plotted on a stacked area graph, however instead of showing an indexed output 
on the primary axis, a percentage contribution to revenue for each commodity 
segment was used.  The December 2005 data is the reported revenue contribution 
for each of the segments for the FY2005, with changes to production and 
commodity price varying the revenue for each segment.   The graphs for the four 
companies are shown in Figure 4.9 to Figure 4.12 drawn from data in Appendix 
7.16 to Appendix 7.19.  As a check of the accuracy of the calculations, for Anglo 
American the actual reported revenue for 2015 was 70% of the 2005 level whilst 
the calculated value was 63%.  This difference is because the estimated revenue 
uses a single commodity price and commodity production per segment, when in 
reality a segment may be made up of a number of different commodities.  
However, for the purpose of this comparison, the estimated revenue calculation 
is a good representation of the total revenue contribution of each commodity. 
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4.5.1 Anglo American’s revenue 
Figure 4.9 shows Anglo American’s estimated revenue which was drawn using 
input data in Appendix 7.16.  This has been calculated by multiplying the indexed 
commodity price by the indexed production output for each sector. 
 
Figure 4.9 : Anglo American’s estimated revenue and EV 
Source : Anglo American (2006 – 2016) 
As shown in Figure 4.9, in 2005 almost 50% of Anglo American’s revenue was made 
up of non-mining based business.  This included its steel businesses Scaw Metals 
and Samancor group, the sugar producer Tongaat-Hulett and a paper and 
packaging group Mondi.  This lower reliance on mineral commodities from 2005 
to 2008 when prices were booming could have been one of the reasons why Anglo 
American underperformed compared to the other companies (as indicated in 
Section 4.2) as it was not able to capitalise on booming commodity prices.   The 
revenue contribution of this “others” group declined from 2005 to contribute 
around 10% of revenue as of 2015 as the company returned its focus on 
commodities.  This included the disposal of the Mondi group in 2007 as discussed 
in Section 1.7.1. 
The increased revenue from higher coal prices from 2005 to mid-2008 can be seen 
as a big contributor to Anglo American’s revenue.  An increase in coal and iron ore 
production over the 10 year period, as shown previously in Figure 4.4, has been 
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largely offset by declining prices in these sectors from mid-2011 to 2015.  From 
2010 to 2013 approximately 40% of its revenue was from iron ore and coal.  This 
sector has had the biggest decline in prices from 2010 to 2015 meaning that Anglo 
American’s revenue has been dropping, resulting in declining EV over this period.  
Unfortunately, as the company has started to increase iron ore output from late 
2014 (as shown in Figure 4.4) with the commissioning of the Minas Rio project, 
this has been offset by faster declining prices meaning revenue from the sector 
continued to contract.   
Revenue from copper, platinum and nickel has remained relatively flat between 
2006 and 2015 except for a slight decline in 2008 during the GFC.  However in total 
these two sectors contributed less than 20% of revenue for most of the 10 year 
period.  Whilst Figure 4.4 shows nickel production growing from 2012 – 2015, it is 
such a small contributor to revenue that this had little influence on the total 
company’s EV. 
In comparing the estimated revenue to the EV, there appears to be a very good 
correlation between the two.  The Pearson correlation, calculated between total 
revenue and EV, is very high at 0.9 as discussed later in this report.  Apart from a 
slight drop in EV in late 2009/early 2010, which could be as a result of post GFC 
sentiment, in general the EV tracks very closely to estimated revenue.  This would 
suggest that revenue is a key driver of EV for Anglo American, and could explain 
some of the trends in terms of the company’s performance.  For example, the 
lower increase in EV from 2006 to 2008 compared to the companies was primarily 
as a result of the company’s higher exposure to non-commodity businesses.  Then 
its slower recovery from 2008 to 2010 was due to the flat production in its iron 
ore and coal business, when prices were booming within these sectors.  Finally, 
the faster decline from 2010 to 2015 is a consequence of its exposure to coal and 
iron ore, both of which have been the worst price performers over this period.   
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4.5.2 BHP Billiton’s revenue 
BHP Billiton is one of the two companies which increased its EV by approximately 
15% from 2006 to 2015.  It was the best performer of the four companies during 
the GFC commodity price crash, and together with Rio Tinto has significantly 
outperformed the other two companies from mid-2011 to 2015 as shown in Figure 
4.1.  Its revenue mix is shown in Figure 4.10 drawn from data in Appendix 7.17.   
 
Figure 4.10 : BHP Billiton’s estimated revenue and EV 
Source : BHP Billiton (2005 – 2015) & South 32 (2105) 
As of the end of 2005 the company was fairly well diversified, with approximately 
20% of its revenue each from petroleum, aluminium, base metals and iron ore.  
These sectors grew primarily on higher commodity prices, though iron ore 
production was up by 20% in mid-2008 compared to 2005 (Figure 4.5) meaning it 
became a bigger contributor to revenue.  It appears that BHP Billiton was the 
company least affected by the GFC due to a steady output of iron ore and 
petroleum which remained at above the 2005 output during the course of 2008.  
Then following the GFC, the company started to increase iron ore and petroleum 
production (Figure 4.5) with these two sectors growing to contribute over half of 
the company’s revenue by 2011.  It is likely that the strong recovery in EV from 
2008 to 2011 can be attributed to this exposure and the increased production in 
these sectors.  Copper also slightly grew to contribute around 20% of BHP Billiton’s 
revenue from 2013.  The consistent revenue from aluminium and base metals, 
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which have been less affected by declining prices from 2011, have resulted in a 
lower decline in EV than Anglo American and Rio Tinto which have a bigger 
exposure to iron ore. 
In comparing BHP Billiton’s EV to total theoretical revenue, like Anglo American it 
is clear that there is a close correlation between the two.  As with Anglo American 
there appears to be a drop in EV in late 2009, and a similar drop in late 2012, both 
possibly as a result of pricing speculation.  However, in general the trend appears 
to be close as is confirmed by the Pearson correlation which is high at 0.8.   
4.5.3 Rio Tinto’s revenue   
Rio Tinto was by far the best performer from 2005 to 2008 as shown previously in 
Figure 4.1.  It would appear this success can primarily be attributed to the 
company’s iron ore, copper and aluminium divisions as shown in Figure 4.11 
drawn using data from Appendix 7.18. 
 
Figure 4.11 : Rio Tinto’s estimated revenue and EV 
Source : Rio Tinto (2006 – 2016a)  
Rising iron ore prices from 2005 to 2008 resulted in the iron ore segment revenue 
increasing almost fourfold over the same period.  Similarly, the acquisition of Alcan 
in 2007 resulted in aluminium production increasing almost fivefold, and the 
aluminium sector contributing close to one-third of revenue in mid-2008.  Energy 
revenue, comprising Rio Tinto’s thermal coal business, also grew in this period, 
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purely as a result of rising prices.  As such, by mid-2008, total revenue had 
increased to over three times the 2005 level, with EV tracking closely with similar 
gains.  However, this exposure to iron ore and coal resulted in the company being 
affected badly by the drop in bulk prices during the 2008 onset of the GFC.  It was 
only its copper business revenue which remained relatively stable, with copper the 
least affected by declining prices.  This segment was particularly important from 
2011 to 2015 reducing some of the heavy losses from iron ore over the period. 
With the recovery of all commodity prices post the GFC, Rio Tinto continued to 
increase iron ore production and was able to capitalise on iron ore being the best 
recovering commodity from the start of 2009 to the end of 2013.  As such revenue 
from this sector increased almost threefold during 2009 remained at these levels 
until the end of 2013.  However, has been steadily declining from the end of 2013 
to 2015.  For the same recovery period (2009 to 2013), aluminium’s recovery was 
much slower than any of the other commodities. 
As with the previous two companies, Rio Tinto’s EV tracks very closely with its 
theoretical revenue.  The extraordinary jump in revenue as a result of the Alcan 
acquisition resulted in a similar increase in EV.  The Pearson correlation between 
the two is high at 0.9 confirming the direct relationship between EV and revenue.    
As with the others, price sentiment caused a drop in EV in late 2009 and 2012 
against stable revenues for these periods.  Revenue could also describe Rio Tinto’s 
success prior to the GFC which can be attributed to increased iron ore output and 
the acquisition of Alcan.  These two sectors, as well as a stable revenue stream 
from copper, have ensured the company’s success following the GFC to 2015.    
4.5.4 CVRD-Vale’s revenue 
Figure 4.12 shows CVRD-Vale’s EV and revenue results drawn from data in 
Appendix 7.19.  Unlike the other companies’ production output and price data, 
which was indexed back to 100% in 2005, all CVRD-Vale data was indexed to 100% 
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in June 2010.  This was because this was the first period where the company 
produced from all commodity sectors.  EV is also only shown from mid-2006 due 
to a share split in early 2006. 
 
Figure 4.12 : CVRD-Vale’s estimated revenue and EV 
Source : Vale (2006 – 2016)  
CVRD-Vale’s primary commodity has traditionally been iron ore which contributed 
almost three-quarters of its revenue in 2005.  In addition to this, in 2005 a 10% 
contribution was from its logistic business and aluminium and less than 5% from 
base metals and copper.  A jump in nickel production, along with price growth 
from iron ore, resulted in revenue doubling from 2005 to mid-2008.  However, it 
appears price expectations around iron ore resulted in a drop in EV in mid-2007 
prior to the onset of the GFC. 
It was CVRD-Vale’s exposure to iron ore which caused total revenue, and as such 
company value, to drop considerably in 2008, but similarly recovered to pre-GFC 
levels in the following years.  Increased production of coal, copper and fertilizer 
from 2010, as shown in Figure 4.7, contributed the least to earnings, primarily due 
to declining prices in these commodities over the same period.  As such, where 
iron ore ensured recovery in 2009, this same sector was the worst performer in 
terms of price from 2013 to 2015 which meant that CVRD-Vale was the worst 
performer in terms of EV over the same period. 
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Thus the EV of CVRD-Vale can be predominately matched to the price cycles of 
iron ore.  As such revenue has tracked EV with a high correlation of 0.7.  Other 
than the unexplained drop in mid-2007, and the similar drops to the other 
companies in late 2009, changes to EV appear to be as a result of changes to 
revenue.  Good growth in 2006 to 2008 was brought to an abrupt halt in 2008 by 
the GFC, followed by better than average recovery of prices post-GFC which 
ensured the rapid recovery of EV.  Poor performance in this sector from 2013 to 
2015 resulted in EV contracting to values below the 2006 level as of the end of 
2015. 
4.5.5 Correlation of revenue to EV 
As discussed for each company in Section 4.5, the Pearson correlation coefficient 
of revenue against EV is shown in Table 4.2 obtained from data in Appendix 7.16 
to Appendix 7.19.  These values are all above 0.5 suggesting that there is a very 
strong correlation between revenue and EV.   
Table 4.2 : Pearson correlation coefficients of revenue against EV 
Anglo American BHP Billiton Rio Tinto CVRD-Vale 
0.9 0.8 0.9 0.7 
High (+) High (+) High (+) High (+) 
 
In addition to the high correlation coefficient, graphically the correlation between 
company value and revenue can be clearly seen in Figure 4.9 to Figure 4.12.  The 
total revenue tracks the EV for all the companies.  As such, from both the Pearson 
correlation coefficient and graphical analysis of the commodity price and 
production mix compared to EV, it was determined that revenue is a strong driver 
of company value.  It was therefore classified as a key value driver of company 
value.  Since revenue is determined by both commodity price and production, 
companies must ensure that they are increasing production on commodities with 
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increasing prices.  In many cases this may occur by luck, with prediction of key 
commodities for price growth a separate topic of discussion altogether.   
4.6 Valuation multiples 
Two different valuation multiples included in the analysis are EBITDA multiple and 
EBITDA margin.  Figure 4.13 to Figure 4.16 show the valuation multiples against EV 
for the four companies.   Appendix 7.20 to Appendix 7.27 present the input data 
for these graphs with Appendix 7.5 to Appendix 7.8 showing the source data used 
to calculate the valuation multiples and capital efficiency measures.  Using a 
Pearson correlation coefficient analysis the relationships between changes to each 
metric and changes to EV were determined.  It is important to note that since 
indexed values were used, this correlation is on changes to each metric rather than 
the discrete value of each.   
 
Figure 4.13 : Anglo American’s valuation multiples compared to EV 
Source : Anglo American (2006 – 2016)  
 
Figure 4.14 : BHP Billiton’s valuation multiples compared to EV 
Source : BHP Billiton (2005 – 2015) & South 32 (2105) 
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Figure 4.15 : Rio Tinto’s valuation multiples compared to EV 
Source : Rio Tinto (2006 – 2016a) 
 
Figure 4.16 : CVRD-Vale’s valuation multiples compared to EV 
Source : Vale (2006 – 2016) 
As can be seen from Figure 4.13 to Figure 4.16 the EBITDA multiple tracks EV 
relatively closely for all the companies except BHP Billiton, where the EBITDA 
multiple has remained relatively flat.  In contrast there is little correlation with 
EBITDA margin, with little movement in this metric over the 10 years for all 
companies.  To confirm these observations the Pearson coefficient was calculated 
to determine the correlation between the valuation multiples and EV. 
4.6.1 Analysis of EBITDA multiple 
Table 4.3 shows the Pearson correlation coefficient for EBITDA multiples for the 
four companies.  These are based on the data included in Figure 4.13 to Figure 
4.16. 
Table 4.3 : Pearson correlation coefficients of EBITDA multiple against EV 
Anglo American BHP Billiton Rio Tinto CVRD-Vale 
0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 
High (+) Medium (+) High (+) High (+) 
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From these coefficient values, it can be seen that there is a high correlation 
between changes to EBITDA multiple and EV for all companies except BHP Billiton, 
which was slightly below 0.5.  This is in line with the observations from the graphs 
where EBITDA multiple tracks EV closely.  An alternate analysis, as shown in Figure 
4.17, was to compare the EBITDA multiples of each of the companies, rather than 
the indexed values.  
 
Figure 4.17 : EBITDA multiples for the four mining companies 
Sources : Anglo American (2006 – 2016), BHP Billiton (2005 – 2015),  
South 32 (2015), Rio Tinto (2006 – 2016a) & Vale (2006 – 2016)  
 
Other than CVRD-Vale being quite volatile during the GFC when earnings were also 
unstable, on average all companies are within the window of around 6.0 EBITDA 
multiple.  The EBITDA multiple for BHP Billiton, the lowest for most of the period, 
has remained relatively stable around 4 for the entire period.  Anglo American and 
Rio Tinto have tracked fairly closely throughout the period, indicating no major 
difference between EV to earnings between the two.  This would suggest that the 
levels of EBITDA multiple are not a key value driver of company value.   
In summary, based on the Pearson coefficient between EBITDA multiple and EV, 
there is a high correlation.  As such this suggests that EBITDA multiple is a key 
driver of company value, however more so changes to EBITDA multiple rather than 
the actual value of such. 
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4.6.2 Analysis of EBITDA margin 
Analysis of the previously shown Figure 4.13 to Figure 4.16 suggest that there is 
little correlation between EBITDA margin and EV.  The Pearson correlation 
coefficients confirm this as shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 : Pearson correlation coefficients of EBITDA margin against EV 
Anglo 
American 
BHP Billiton Rio Tinto CVRD-Vale 
0.7 0.1 -0.1 0.1 
High (+) Low (+) Low (-) Low (+) 
 
EBITDA margin, a measure of the portion of revenue which is earnings compared 
to costs, has a very low Pearson correlation coefficient against EV in all the 
companies except Anglo American.  The reason for this high correlation for Anglo 
American could possibly related to the company’s efforts to decrease their EBITDA 
margin from 2011 when at the same time EV was declining.  For Rio Tinto, there is 
a negative low correlation between EV and EBITDA margin.  Because of this 
variability, in terms of correlation to EV it appears that EBITDA margin is not a 
value driver.   Similarly in comparing the EBITDA margin between companies as 
shown in Figure 4.18, there appears to be a weak correlation between the 
companies which performed well, and those which did not do as well.   
 
Figure 4.18 : EBITDA margins for the four mining companies 
Sources : Anglo American (2006 – 2016), BHP Billiton (2005 – 2015),  
South 32 (2015), Rio Tinto (2006 – 2016a) & Vale (2006 – 2016)  
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One comment which is relevant is that Anglo American, which was the worst 
performing company over the 10 year period, has the lowest EBITDA margin for 
most of the period.  This could suggest that high costs does have an effect on 
company value. However, this is not confirmed by the CVRD-Vale data, particularly 
for the period 2009 – 2015 which had a higher EBITDA margin than Rio Tinto but 
lost more company value.  Over that same period, CVRD-Vale appears to have the 
fastest declining EBITDA margin which would suggest that it was struggling to 
control costs.  Thus, whilst EBITDA margin is an important metric for ensuring costs 
are kept to a reasonable level, this does not appear to be a key driver of company 
value. 
4.7 Capital efficiency ratios 
The three potential capital efficiency value drivers analysed were gearing ratio, net 
debt to EBITDA and ROCE.  As with the valuation multiples, the indexed values 
were compared to EV for each company to determine if correlation exists between 
the indexed values and EV.  Then the actual ratios were compared between 
companies to identify any trends between the four companies.  The indexed 
capital efficiency measures for each company are shown in Figure 4.19 to Figure 
4.22. 
 
Figure 4.19 : Anglo American’s capital efficiency measures 
Source : Anglo American (2006 – 2016) 
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Figure 4.20 : BHP Billiton’s capital efficiency measures 
Source : BHP Billiton (2005 – 2015) & South 32 (2105) 
 
Figure 4.21 : Rio Tinto’s capital efficiency measures 
Source : Rio Tinto (2006 – 2016a) 
 
Figure 4.22 : CVRD-Vale’s capital efficiency measures 
Source : Vale (2006 – 2016) 
As with the valuation multiples it is difficult to see any clear correlation between 
the capital efficiency measures and EV for each of the companies.  As such the 
Pearson correlation coefficient was calculated for each capital efficiency measure. 
4.7.1 Analysis of gearing ratio 
Table 4.5 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients for gearing ratio against EV 
for each of the companies.  What is notable is that for two of the companies, Anglo 
American and BHP Billiton the correlation coefficients are negative, and for the 
other two the correlation coefficients are positive.  This means that for those 
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companies with a positive correlation, as gearing ratio increases EV also increases, 
whereas when the correlation is negative the opposite occurs.   
Table 4.5 : Pearson correlation coefficients of gearing ratio against EV 
Anglo American BHP Billiton Rio Tinto CVRD-Vale 
-0.5 -0.1 0.3 0.2 
Medium (-) Low (-) Low (+) Low 
Since the correlation is low for three of the companies this would suggest that 
gearing ratio is not a driver of EV.  Similarly, for Anglo American whilst the 
correlation is medium, it is a negative correlation.  This can be observed in Figure 
4.19 that when the gearing ratio is high, EV is low and vice versa.  However, this is 
in contradiction to Rio Tinto which has a low/medium positive correlation with EV, 
though this is much more difficult to observe in Figure 4.21.  As an additional 
comparison, Figure 4.23 shows a comparison of gearing ratios between the four 
companies. 
 
Figure 4.23 : Gearing ratios for the four mining companies 
Sources : Anglo American (2006 – 2016), BHP Billiton (2005 – 2015),  
South 32 (2015), Rio Tinto (2006 – 2016a) & Vale (2006 – 2016)  
In the first five years of Figure 4.23 there was a large spread between each of the 
companies and only from 2011 where the ratios were more closely aligned.   Rio 
Tinto had an exceptionally high debt level from 2007 to 2009, primarily as a result 
of the acquisition of Alcan.  This acquisition boosted Rio Tinto’s aluminium 
production and EV to make it the best performer among the four companies from 
2006 to the GFC in mid-2008.  What is surprising is that the high levels of debt 
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associated with this acquisition did not appear to affect the company’s value 
compared to the other companies.  As such it would appear that in the boom and 
recovery period from 2006 to 2010, gearing had little effect on EV.  This is likely 
because companies and investors were both chasing growth at any cost rather 
than considering debt levels.   
A trend is apparent from the period of declining prices from 2011.  Whilst Anglo 
American had the lowest gearing ratio as of 2011, it started to borrow with its net 
debt rising from $USb1.4 at the end of 2011 to a peak of $USb13.5 in June 2015 as 
shown in Appendix 7.5.   This jump in debt was primarily associated with the 
acquisition of the Minas Rio Iron Ore project.  However, what is different to Rio 
Tinto’s 2007 jump in debt is that little was added to EV with this increased debt.  
CVRD-Vale was similar, with its gearing ratio increasing from 10% in June 2011 to 
over 40% at the end of 2015.  This is in comparison to BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, 
which both had better EV performances over this period and maintained their 
gearing ratios at less than 25%.   
Both BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto make mention of gearing in their 2015 annual 
reports.  BHP Billiton in its policy on debt and liquidity management indicated that 
gearing should be a maximum of 40% (BHP Billiton, 2015).  Rio Tinto was more 
conservative suggesting that the gearing ratio should be kept between 20% and 
30% in order to maintain a robust balance sheet (Rio Tinto, 2015).  Neither Anglo 
American nor CVRD-Vale made any mention on a focus or target for gearing, which 
could explain why this ratio has been increasing for these companies.   
Thus whilst analysis of EV and gearing ratio over the 10 year period suggests that 
there is low a correlation, comparison of short periods indicate some correlation. 
In the period of declining prices from mid-2011 to end of 2015, those companies 
with faster increasing gearing ratios had more rapidly declining EV.  In fact, when 
the Pearson correlation coefficient between EV and gearing ratio is calculated over 
the period from 2011 to 2015, the correlation was high and negative for all 
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companies.  This would suggest that gearing ratio is only a value driver in times of 
declining commodity prices.  In many cases this is when asset write downs are 
common and as such investors and companies are concerned with levels of debt, 
which as such can affect share price.  
4.7.2 Analysis of net debt to EBITDA ratio 
Net debt to EBITDA ratio is a similar measure to gearing ratio, in that it is a measure 
of how much debt the company has.  As such, as can be seen in Figure 4.19 to 
Figure 4.22 the net debt to EBITDA and gearing ratios track relatively closely.  Table 
4.6 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients for net debt to EBITDA ratio against 
EV.   
Table 4.6 : Pearson correlation coefficients for net debt to EBITDA ratio against EV 
Anglo American BHP Billiton Rio Tinto CVRD-Vale 
-0.7 0.0 0.5 -0.4 
High (-) Low Medium (+) Medium (-) 
 
For all four companies there does not appear to be a consistent correlation 
between net debt to EBITDA and EV.  BHP Billiton had no correlation, meaning the 
values are completely random to each other, whilst Anglo American and CVRD-
Vale had a negative correlation and Rio Tinto a positive one.  This suggests that 
based on the Pearson correlation coefficient analysis over the 10 year period, net 
debt to EBITDA is not a driver of EV.  Analysis of the values between companies, 
as per Figure 4.24 confirm similar observations to those from gearing ratio 
analysis.   
 Page 72 
 
 
 
Figure 4.24 : Net debt to EBITDA ratio for the four mining companies 
Sources : Anglo American (2006 – 2016), BHP Billiton (2005 – 2015),  
South 32 (2015), Rio Tinto (2006 – 2016a) & Vale (2006 – 2016)  
As with the gearing ratio, the most noticeable trend is the sharply increasing net 
debt to EBITDA ratio for Anglo American and CVRD-Vale from 2011 to 2015.  Whilst 
all companies have experienced an increase in net debt to EBITDA ratio as a result 
of reduced earnings from the end of 2010, Anglo American has made the situation 
worse by its rapid increase in debt.  As with the gearing ratio, Rio Tinto’s debt 
levels jumped with the acquisition of Alcan, however it succeeded in getting this 
under control and to manageable levels over the next three years post the 
acquisition.  Both BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto have managed to maintain this ratio 
between one and two from 2010 to 2015, giving the companies added flexibility 
during times of decreasing earnings.   
According to Price Waterhouse Coopers (2016) net debt to EBITDA ratios above 
four should cause alarm, which none of these companies achieved.  However, the 
Price Waterhouse Coopers (2106) also indicated that the average net debt to 
EBITDA ratio of the top 40 mining companies was 1.52 in 2014 and 2.46 in 2015.  
Thus, the two companies, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, which have performed 
relatively well over the 2010 – 2015 period, have net debt to EBITDA ratios less 
than the average, and the other two companies which have performed poor have 
ratios above this average.   
To confirm the observation of correlation when prices were declining, the Pearson 
correlation between net debt to EBITDA and EV for the period from end-2010 to 
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end-2015 was calculated.  All companies had a high negative correlation with 
Anglo American, BHP Billiton and CVRD-Vale having a correlation coefficient of          
-0.8 which suggests a very high correlation.  This indicates that as with gearing 
ratio, net debt to EBITDA ratio is particularly important in times of declining prices 
and revenues.  More specifically, in times of declining prices, the issue of net debt 
must be kept to a manageable level depending on company size and industry 
outlook, measured against value and company earnings.  
4.7.3 Analysis of ROCE 
The final capital efficiency metric, is ROCE which is a measure of how well a 
company uses capital to generate returns.  Analysing Figure 4.21 it appears that 
for Rio Tinto, ROCE was relatively flat and thus had little influence on EV.  However, 
from the Pearson correlation coefficient, as shown in Table 4.7 Rio Tinto has a 
medium negative correlation between ROCE and EV.   
Table 4.7 : Pearson correlation coefficients of ROCE against EV 
Anglo American BHP Billiton Rio Tinto CVRD-Vale 
0.3 0.2 -0.5 0.5 
Low (+) Low (+) Medium (-) Medium (+) 
 
Both Rio Tinto and CVRD-Vale had a medium correlation, but one was negative 
and the other positive.  Both Anglo American and BHP Billiton had low positive 
correlation coefficients.  This range of values suggests that there is little 
correlation between ROCE and EV.  This is confirmed by analysing the ratios 
between companies, as shown in Figure 4.25.   
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Figure 4.25 : Return on capital employed for the four mining companies 
Sources : Anglo American (2006 – 2016), BHP Billiton (2005 – 2015),  
South 32 (2015), Rio Tinto (2006 – 2016a) & Vale (2006 – 2016)  
For all companies, the trend is generally downwards, as declining prices make it 
more difficult to get the higher returns from the same capital.  Anglo American is 
particularly interesting to analyse since ROCE is the primary return measure used 
by the company.  In 2013, with the appointment of its new CEO Mark Cuttifani, 
the company reported that it was focusing on ROCE, stating that “during the 
downturn we have seen the mining industry’s ROCE plummet from around 24% to 
about 10%” (Anglo American, 2014, p9).  At that time its ROCE was around 11% 
and the company committed to a target of a sustainable minimum ROCE of 15% 
by 2016.  The company was so committed to this that the CEO’s bonus was linked 
to achieving this 15%.  ROCE then decreased even further to 9% in 2014 and then 
5% in 2015 (Anglo American, 2016b), suggesting that this measure was not being 
achieved.  None of the other companies reported their ROCE or made reference 
to ROCE in their annual reports, suggesting that it is not an important metric for 
them. 
Whilst Anglo American is very focused on ROCE, the general spread and trends 
shown in Figure 4.25 suggest that ROCE is not a key value driver of company value.  
Where Anglo American had a significantly higher ROCE than Rio Tinto and CVRD-
Vale in 2008 and 2009, the company was the worst performer in terms of growing 
company value.  Similarly Rio Tinto had a number of years of very low ROCE yet it 
has been one of the top performers of the four companies.  As such it can be 
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confirmed and concluded that based on this analysis and the Pearson correlation 
coefficients, ROCE is not a key driver of company value. 
4.8 Chapter summary 
Analysis of the different metrics, using both a visual comparison of the relationship 
between the metric and EV and by calculating the Pearson correlation coefficient 
between each metric and EV, determined the key drivers of company value.  
Analysis of production output on its own, not considering any of the economic 
elements (especially price), indicated that there was no direct relationship 
between production output and EV.  Instead, this metric is only a value driver 
when related with commodity price to derive revenue for the sector.  Revenue 
appeared to have the greatest influence on EV, and as such is the most important 
key driver of EV and thus company value.   
From analysis of the four companies it was found that there is a correlation 
between EBITDA multiple and EV from both the observed trends between EV and 
EBITDA multiple and the Pearson correlation coefficient for the four companies.  
For the two debt based ratios, gearing and net debt to EBITDA, whilst both had 
inconsistent correlations over the full 10 year period, they had high correlation to 
EV for the period of declining prices from the end of 2010 to 2015.  This would 
suggest that both gearing and net debt to EBITDA ratios only influence company 
value in times of declining commodity prices.  EBITDA margin and ROCE were 
found to have no correlation to EV, and as such are not key drivers of company 
value. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Chapter overview 
This final chapter provides an overview of the findings from the research study.  
First, each of the potential value drivers analysed are reviewed and the key drivers 
of company value identified.  Then the observations of trends in company 
performance are discussed and summarised. Finally, a number of 
recommendations are provided for additional work given the outcomes of this 
research study. 
5.2 Findings 
Eight different potential value drivers were analysed against EV to determine 
which were key drivers of company value.  These eight different potential drivers 
are production output, commodity price, revenue (calculated based on the 
production and commodity price), EBITDA multiple, EBITDA margin, gearing ratio, 
net debt to EBITDA and ROCE.  A number of findings were observed when 
comparing each of these potential drivers with EV as discussed in the following 
sub-sections. 
5.2.1 Production output 
Production output was found not to be a driver of company value.  This is because 
this metric does not take into account any economic factors, in particular 
commodity price.  For example, increasing production in a commodity which has 
declining prices or high extractive costs can destroy rather than increase EV.  This 
was observed from 2011 to 2015, when whilst most of the four companies 
increased total production output, EV decreased as a result of the declining 
commodity prices.  This suggests that production output alone is not a key driver 
of company value. 
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5.2.2 Commodity prices 
 Analysis of commodity price trends over the ten year period was found not to be 
a driver of company value.  This is because of the differing performance of the 
different commodities’ prices over the period.  Where diamonds prices have 
remained relatively flat over the period, bulk commodities and energy prices 
increased almost four fold from 2005 to mid-2008.  As such any correlation 
between company value and commodity prices must consider the exposure the 
company has to each commodity.  For non-diversified mining companies, which 
only have exposure to a single commodity, the commodity price would be a key 
value driver the price would directly influence revenue.  However, for diversified 
multi-commodity companies a more suitable metric is to combine production 
output and commodity price to estimate revenue.  
5.2.3 Revenue 
Each company’s total revenue was analysed by combining production output and 
commodity price for each quarter.  This calculation represents an estimate of the 
revenue for the different companies as a result of production output and price 
variations.  For all four companies this was found to have a very strong correlation 
with EV from both the visual analysis of the results and by calculating the Pearson 
correlation coefficient between the two.  This suggests that the basket of 
commodities which a company produces is a major driver of company value.  
Companies must ensure that they are increasing production on commodities with 
increasing prices.  Unfortunately given the difficulties in accurate forecasting of 
prices, and even if these are correct, the scarcity of mineral deposits and the long 
lead time to develop a mining operation make it difficult for a company to pick and 
choose the best performing commodities to invest in.  However, some 
consideration should be given to the selection of value adding mineral 
commodities in order to drive revenue and consequently company value.   
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5.2.4 EBITDA multiple 
EBITDA multiple, which is a measure of company value as a multiple of annual 
earnings, was found to have a high correlation to EV for all four companies.  As 
such, it is considered a key driver of company value.  As EBITDA and revenue are 
closely aligned, this would support the previous findings that revenue is a key 
driver.  As such, companies must focus on increasing earnings.  Major decreases 
to earnings will likely result in a similar drop in EV as the EBITDA multiple 
normalises this out. 
5.2.5 EBITDA margin 
EBITDA margin is a measure of the relationship between revenue and earnings and 
represents a company’s ability to keep its costs under control.  Surprisingly EBITDA 
margin was found not to have a correlation to EV for any of the companies except 
Anglo American.  As such it was not considered a key driver of company value.  
Whilst there may not be a direct link Anglo American, which was the worst 
performing company over the 10 year period, had the lowest EBITDA margin 
indicating that cost control is an important consideration for company value. 
5.2.6 Gearing ratio 
The two metrics analysed which consider a company’s debt was gearing ratio and 
net debt to EBITDA.  Gearing ratio is a measure of debt to total company assets 
and provides an indication of the company’s financial strength.  A gearing ratio 
that is too high increases financial risk.  Gearing ratio was not found to have a 
correlation with EV for the period from 2005 to 2011 when commodity prices were 
rising, then crashed with the onset of the GFC and subsequently recovered.  
However, from 2011 to 2015, a period which has seen commodity prices slowly 
declining, there is a high correlation between EV and gearing.  This would suggest 
that gearing, and as such debt levels, are more important in times of declining 
commodity prices and revenue.  This is because during these periods, declining 
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revenue raises concerns around a company’s ability to make debt repayments, 
with these making up a growing portion of the company costs.  During these times 
companies must consider and manage their levels of debt. 
5.2.7 Net debt to EBITDA ratio 
Net debt to EBITDA ratio measures the company’s ability to pay back its debt from 
earnings.  As with gearing ratio, a noticeable trend was an increasing gearing ratio 
and declining EV for Anglo American and CVRD-Vale from 2011 to 2015.  However, 
like gearing ratio, there was no correlation between net debt to EBIDTA ratio from 
2005 to 2011.  Only from 2011 to 2015 when prices were declining was there a 
strong correlation between EV and net debt to EBITDA ratio.  This confirms the 
conclusions from gearing ratio which means that debt is a key driver of company 
value in times of declining commodity prices.   
5.2.8 ROCE 
ROCE is a measure of a company’s use of capital to generate revenue.  Interestingly 
Anglo American consider this as an important metric that from 2014 they included 
ROCE in its CEO’s performance measures.  However, from analysis of the four 
companies there was found to be no correlation between EV and ROCE.  In fact 
Rio Tinto had the lowest ROCE from end-2010 to 2015 yet was one of the better 
performing companies during that period.  Whilst Anglo American considers ROCE 
to be an important metric, the data analysed in this study suggests otherwise.  This 
highlights the importance of understanding which metrics are key value drivers 
and which have little correlation to company value. 
5.2.9 Specific vale drivers over the 10 year period 
The initial analysis of company value raised a number of key questions regarding 
the differing performance of the four companies.  Each of these were considered 
in terms of the identified value drivers, to guide the determination of the metrics 
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which most influence company value.  Rio Tinto’s relative outperformance from 
2005 – 2008 can be attributed to its acquisition of Alcan which increased the 
company’s aluminium output almost fivefold and contributed to a doubling of 
revenue.  Whilst net debt increased significantly over this period, affecting gearing 
ratio and net debt to EBITDA, this did not appear to have a negative effect on EV.  
This is possibly due to the high commodity prices and increased revenue that was 
generated during that period.  As such this above par performance was primarily 
revenue driven. 
Anglo American’s underperformance in 2006 to 2008 is potentially due to its 
reduced exposure to mineral commodities over that period.  In 2005 over 50% of 
its revenue was from non-mining business, much of which was not experiencing 
the price growth that the commodity sector was.  This meant that Anglo 
American’s revenue growth was not the same as for the other mining companies, 
and as such EV did not grow significantly.   Similarly the company’s poor recovery 
post-GFC can be attributed to a lack of capitalising on rising prices with flat iron 
ore and coal production outputs.  As such this is also linked to revenue. 
BHP Billiton seems to have fared the best during the GFC price drop by increasing 
iron ore and petroleum production output to minimise the effect on revenue.  It 
also appears that the company’s diversification strategy, ensuring a mix of 
revenues rather than a focus on a single commodity has kept the volatility of 
revenue to a minimum.   
The poor performance of Anglo American and CVRD-Vale compared to BHP Billiton 
and Rio Tinto from 2011 to 2015, when commodity prices were steadily declining, 
appears to be as a result of rising debt within the two companies.  This is reflected 
in changes to the gearing ratio and net debt to EBITDA ratios which were rapidly 
rising for both companies from 2011 to 2015.  In contrast the better performing 
companies, BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, maintained stable gearing ratios and net 
debt to EBITDA ratios during this same period. 
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5.3 Research limitations 
This research was limited to an analysis of four major international diversified 
mining companies.  As such the findings could be limited by the similar histories 
and operating environments for the four companies.  Similarly the full effect of 
any mergers, demergers, acquisitions and sales were not able to be fully captured 
in the analysis.  These could have influenced EV in areas other than the analysed 
metrics. 
5.4 Recommendations for improved performance in mining 
companies 
Mining companies must ensure that they understand the importance of value 
drivers when determining which metrics form part of their KPI’s.  These drivers 
must be those which management are able to influence and which have a high 
impact on company value.  From this study of value drivers, mining companies 
should consider the following when selecting which metrics to focus on: 
 Revenue was found to be the number one value driver. Since revenue is 
determined by both commodity price and production, companies must 
ensure that they are increasing production of those commodities with 
increasing prices; 
 Whilst companies that focused on single commodity’s experienced higher 
revenues when specific commodities were booming, in times of lower 
commodity prices revenue was similarly negatively affected.  As such 
diversified multi-commodity companies experienced much more stable 
revenue, and thus EV, due to the variable performance of each 
commodity.  It is therefore recommended that, as much as practical, 
major mining companies diversify across a range of commodities to 
maintain more stable revenue and thus company value; 
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 Earnings was also found to be an important driver for company value and 
as such companies must manage their EBITDA margin and EBITDA 
multiples; 
 Debt related ratios appeared to only influence company value in times of 
declining prices and as such declining revenue.  Thus, during these 
periods companies should consider and manage their debt levels in 
relation to earnings and EV; and 
 ROCE was found to not have a high correlation with company value.  Thus, 
whilst Anglo American has selected ROCE as a KPI for senior management, 
this study indicates that this metric does not have a high impact on EV.  As 
such the company should review this decision and confirm how changes to 
ROCE impact company value.   
5.5 Recommendations for future research work 
On completion of the research study a number of additional queries arise leading 
to possible future research and these are: 
 Whilst this study was focused on the period till the end of 2015, 2016 has 
been an interesting year for mining companies.  As of mid-November 2016, 
all four companies’ share prices, and as such EVs have increased 
significantly from the 2015 closing prices.  BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto were 
up by approximately 50%, CVRD-Vale well over doubled in price and Anglo 
American was 390% higher.  This would suggest that some changes in 
market conditions and as such the identified key drivers for company value 
should be confirmed for the 2016 period; 
 Other value drivers could be considered, particularly non-financial metrics.  
This could include changes to company management; mergers, demergers, 
acquisitions and sales; capital write-downs and other company 
announcements; and 
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 The study could be expanded to include a broader range of mining 
companies.  This could include juniors and less diversified companies to 
analyse if these same value drivers are relevant for the entire industry.   
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7 APPENDICES 
Appendix 7.1 : Company sector summary - Anglo American 
Source : Anglo American (2006 – 2016) 
Company Commodity grouping Sector summary Commodity for production 
analysis 
Commodity price for 
revenue analysis 
Anglo 
American 
Platinum group 
metals 
Mining of platinum, palladium, 
rhodium and by-product of 
copper, nickel and gold 
Refined platinum production in 
ounces 
Platinum price ($/oz) 
Gold Mining of gold Gold production in ounces Gold price ($/oz) 
Diamonds Mining of diamonds Diamond production in carats Diamond index price ($/ct) 
Coal 
Includes both metallurgical and 
thermal coal 
Total coal output including 
Australian metallurgical coal, 
Australian thermal coal, South 
African export thermal coal and 
South African domestic coal 
pricing 
50% thermal coal & 50% 
coking coal 
(derived from the years that the 
company did report revenue 
split for thermal & coking coal, 
where the contribution was 
close to 50% from each) 
Copper Copper output in tonnes Copper output in tonnes Copper price ($/mt) 
Nickel, niobium & 
mineral sands 
Mining of nickel, niobium and 
phosphates niobium 
This will be represented by nickel 
output in ‘000 tonnes 
Nickel price ($/mt) 
Iron ore & 
manganese 
Mining of iron ore and 
manganese 
Total iron ore production including 
lump and fines in million tonnes 
Iron ore cfr ($/dmtu) 
Other mining, 
industrial & 
corporate 
Includes zinc, Scaw metals, 
Highveld steel, Samancor 
(manganese), Tongaat-Hulett 
(sugar & aluminium) 
No production analysis to occur 
for this 
N/A 
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Appendix 7.2 : Company sector summary - BHP Billiton 
Source : BHP Billiton (2005 – 2016) & South 32 (2015) 
Company Commodity grouping Sector summary Commodity for production 
analysis 
Commodity price for 
revenue analysis 
BHP Billiton 
Petroleum & potash 
Exploration, development and 
production of oil and gas & 
potash 
Total petroleum output which 
includes crude oil, condensate and 
natural gas liquids and natural gas 
in million barrels of oil equivalent 
(boe).  Since potash is a minor 
contributor it is not included in the 
production analysis 
Crude oil average ($/bbl) 
Aluminium, 
manganese & nickel 
Mining of bauxite, refining of 
bauxite into alumina and 
smelting of alumina into 
aluminium metal.  Mining of 
manganese ore and production 
of manganese metal and alloys.   
Mining & production of nickel 
products 
Aluminium is the main output and 
contributor to revenue for this 
sector the total aluminium output 
in ‘000 tonnes will be used for the 
production analysis 
Aluminium ($/mt) 
Base metals 
Mining of copper, silver, lead, 
zinc, molybdenum, uranium and 
gold. 
Copper is the main contributor to 
revenue for this sector. Measured 
in ‘000 tonnes  
Copper ($/mt) 
Diamond and 
speciality productions 
Mining of diamonds and 
titanium minerals 
Diamond carats produced Diamond index price ($/ct) 
Iron ore Mining of iron ore Iron ore in ‘000 tonnes Iron ore cfr ($/dmtu) 
Metallurgical coal Mining of metallurgical coal Metallurgical coal in ‘000 tonnes Australian HCC coal FOB ($/t) 
Energy coal 
Mining of thermal (energy) coal Energy (thermal) coal in ‘000 
tonnes 
Australian thermal coal FOB 
($/t) 
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Appendix 7.3 : Company sector summary - Rio Tinto 
Source : Rio Tinto (2006 – 2016a) 
Company Commodity grouping Sector summary Commodity for production 
analysis 
Commodity price for 
revenue analysis 
Rio Tinto 
Aluminium 
Mining of bauxite, refining of 
bauxite into alumina and 
smelting of alumina into 
aluminium metal.   
Aluminium is the main output and 
contributor to revenue for this 
sector the total aluminium output 
in ‘000 tonnes will be used for the 
production analysis. 
Aluminium ($/mt) 
Iron ore Mining of iron ore Iron ore in ‘000 tonnes Iron ore cfr ($/dmtu) 
Diamonds & 
industrial minerals 
Mining of diamonds, Rio Tinto 
Iron and Titanium division 
(RTIT) which produces titanium 
dioxide, Rio Tinto Minerals & 
Dampier salt 
As over 50% of this sectors 
revenue is from titanium dioxide 
since titanium dioxide price history 
is difficult to obtain, diamonds will 
be used 
Diamonds ($/ct) 
Copper Mining of copper Copper in ‘000 tonnes Copper ($/mt) 
Energy 
Mining of thermal coal and 
uranium. 
Majority of revenue from thermal 
coal thus total thermal coal output 
used. 
Australian thermal coal FOB 
($/t) 
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Appendix 7.4 : Company sector summary - CVRD-Vale 
Source : Vale (2006 – 2016) 
Company Commodity grouping Sector summary Commodity for production 
analysis 
Commodity price for 
revenue analysis 
CVRD-Vale 
Ferrous metals 
Mining of iron ore, pellets, 
ferroralloys and managanese 
Iron ore in ‘000 tonnes Iron ore cfr ($/dmtu) 
Coal 
Mining of thermal coal Thermal coal in ‘000 tonnes Australian Thermal coal FOB 
($/t) 
Base metals 
Mining of nickel and other 
products 
Nickel in ‘000 tonnes Nickel ($/mt) 
Copper Mining of copper Copper in ‘000 tonnes Copper ($/mt) 
Fertilizers 
Mining of potash, phosphates 
nitrogen and other fertilizer 
products 
Phosphate rock in ‘000 tonnes Phosphate rock ($/mt) 
Aluminium 
Mining of bauxite, aluminium 
trading activities, alumina 
refining and aluminium metal 
smelting 
Bauxite is the main output and 
contributor for revenue for this 
sector.  Total bauxite output in 
‘000 tonnes 
Aluminium ($/mt) 
Logistics & others 
Large logistics systems in Brazil 
including railroads, maritime 
terminals and a port 
N/A N/A 
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Appendix 7.5 : Economic data – Anglo American 
Source : Anglo American (2006 – 2016) & Yahoo Finance (2016a) 
 EV EBITDA EBITDA 
annual 
Group 
revenue 
(6 mth) 
Group 
revenue 
(12 mth) 
Net debt Gearing Group 
attributable 
ROCE 
EBITDA to 
revenue 
EBITDA to 
annual 
revenue 
Net debt 
to 
EBITDA 
EV/ 
EBITDA 
Dec-15  $ 19,191   $ 1,139   $ 4,419   $9,657   $23,003  $12,901  37.7% 5.0% 12% 0.2 2.9 4.34 
Jun-15  $ 33,553   $ 3,280     $13,346    $13,500  32.8% 8.0% 25%    
Dec-14  $ 39,106   $ 2,776   $ 7,104   $14,844   $30,988  $12,871  28.6% 9.0% 19% 0.2 1.8 5.50 
Jun-14  $ 44,427   $ 4,328     $16,144    $10,652  23.1% 10.0% 27%    
Dec-13  $ 40,793   $ 4,445   $ 8,806   $16,870   $33,063  $10,652  22.2% 11.0% 26% 0.3 1.2 4.63 
Jun-13  $ 37,309   $ 4,361     $16,193     $ 9,756  19.6% 11.0% 27%    
Dec-12  $ 51,045   $ 2,925   $ 7,867   $16,377   $32,785   $ 8,510  16.4% 13.3% 18% 0.2 1.1 6.49 
Jun-12  $ 48,277   $ 4,942     $16,408     $ 3,124  6.5% 14.0% 30%    
Dec-11  $ 50,417   $ 6,236   $ 13,348   $18,254   $36,548   $ 1,374  3.1% 26.5% 34% 0.4 0.1 3.78 
Jun-11  $ 73,037   $ 7,112     $18,294     $ 6,794  3.1% 26.3% 39%    
Dec-10  $ 76,099   $ 6,569   $ 11,983   $17,914   $32,929   $ 7,384  16.3% 24.8% 37% 0.4 0.6 6.35 
Jun-10  $ 56,731   $ 5,414     $15,015    $10,930  26.6% 18.5% 36%    
Dec-09  $ 69,239   $ 3,945   $ 6,930   $13,505   $24,637  $11,328  28.7% 14.6% 29% 0.3 1.6 9.99 
Jun-09  $ 49,314   $ 2,985     $11,132    $11,335  33.1% 15.2% 27%    
Dec-08  $ 41,266   $ 4,809   $ 11,847   $15,049   $32,964  $11,043  34.3% 36.8% 32% 0.4 0.9 3.48 
Jun-08  $ 96,641   $ 7,038     $17,915     $ 5,400  16.6% 36.9% 39%    
Dec-07  $ 87,379   $ 5,532   $ 12,132   $10,710   $30,559   $ 5,239  16.6% 37.8% 52% 0.4 0.4 7.20 
Jun-07  $ 82,644   $ 6,600     $19,849     $ 5,300  20.1% 37.3% 33%    
Dec-06  $ 69,878   $ 6,341   $ 12,197   $10,579   $29,404   $ 3,324  10.3% 25.3% 60% 0.4 0.3 5.73 
Jun-06  $ 58,341   $ 5,856     $18,825     $ 2,700  11.0% 21.7% 31%    
Dec-05  $ 52,621   $ 4,710   $ 8,959   $17,327  34,472  $ 4,993  17.0% 19.2% 27% 0.3 0.6 5.87 
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Appendix 7.6 : Economic data – BHP Billiton 
Source : BHP Billiton (2005 – 2015), South 32 (2015) &  & Yahoo Finance (2016b) 
 EV EBITDA EBITDA 
annual 
Group 
revenue 
(6 mth) 
Group 
revenue 
(12 mth) 
Net debt Gearing Group 
attributable 
ROCE 
EBITDA to 
revenue 
EBITDA to 
annual 
revenue 
Net debt 
to 
EBITDA 
EV/ 
EBITDA 
Dec-15 $72,120 $5,994  $19,801  $26,016 25.3%  30%    
Jun-15 $99,601 $15,101 $29,595 $22,479 $52,379 $24,819 24.0% 4.9% 67% 57% 0.8 3.37 
Dec-14 $96,939 $14,494  $29,900  $24,900 22.4%  48%    
Jun-14 $127,375 $13,774 $30,292 $33,258 $67,206 $25,786 23.2% 15.8% 41% 45% 0.9 4.20 
Dec-13 $128,868 $16,518  $33,948  $27,100 32.9%  49%    
Jun-13 $115,163 $14,865 $28,109 $33,764 $65,968 $29,105 28.8% 23.0% 44% 43% 1.0 4.10 
Dec-12 $146,140 $13,244  $32,204  $30,400 31.0%  41%    
Jun-12 $120,154 $12,811 $31,554 $19,140 $56,620 $23,607 26.0% 13.5% 67% 56% 0.7 3.81 
Dec-11 $127,123 $18,743  $37,480  $21,500 25.0%  50%    
Jun-11 $146,803 $15,600 $32,904 $22,922 $57,088 $5,823 9.2% 42.8% 68% 58% 0.2 4.46 
Dec-10 $146,691 $17,304  $34,166  $7,915 6.0%  51%    
Jun-10 $102,652 $13,675 $24,513 $28,222 $52,798 $3,308 6.3% 26.4% 48% 46% 0.1 4.19 
Dec-09 $129,581 $10,838  $24,576  $7,915 15.1%  44%    
Jun-09 $93,592 $4,275 $18,214 $20,431 $50,211 $5,586 12.1% 24.6% 21% 36% 0.3 5.14 
Dec-08 $71,534 $13,939  $29,780  $4,168 9.5%  47%    
Jun-08 $139,934 $16,864 $28,031 $33,934 $59,473 $8,458 17.8% 37.5% 50% 47% 0.3 4.99 
Dec-07 $122,762 $11,167  $25,539  $12,200 28.0%  44%    
Jun-07 $103,204 $10,633 $21,127 $25,359 $47,473 $9,971 25.0% 38.4% 42% 45% 0.5 4.88 
Dec-06 $69,757 $10,494  $22,114  $7,200 20.3%  47%    
Jun-06 $75,819 $17,098 $25,069 $21,019 $39,099 $8,200 27.2% 36.6% 81% 64% 0.3 3.02 
Dec-05 $62,767 $7,971  18,080  $8,700 25.2%  44%    
NB: 2015 data includes reported data from South 32 Annual reports 
Page 99 
 
Appendix 7.7 : Economic data – Rio Tinto 
Source : Rio Tinto (2006 – 2016a) & Yahoo Finance (2016c) 
 EV EBITDA EBITDA 
annual 
Group 
revenue 
(6 mth) 
Group 
revenue 
(12 mth) 
Net debt Gearing Group 
attributable 
ROCE 
EBITDA 
to 
revenue 
EBITDA to 
annual 
revenue 
Net debt 
to 
EBITDA 
EV/ 
EBITDA 
Dec-15 $67,902 $4,755 $12,058 $17,551 $36,785 $13,783 23.8% 4.9% 27% 33% 1.1 5.63 
Jun-15 $88,536 $7,303  $19,234  $13,683 21.3%  38%    
Dec-14 $99,239 $8,387 $18,840 $24,476 $50,041 $12,495 18.6% 13.1% 34% 38% 0.7 5.27 
Jun-14 $109,628 $10,453  $25,565  $12,495 18.6%  41%    
Dec-13 $121,222 $10,799 $20,953 $28,009 $54,599 $18,055 25.2% 8.3% 39% 38% 0.9 5.79 
Jun-13 $98,878 $10,154  $26,590  $22,105 28.3%  38%    
Dec-12 $124,023 $9,484 $20,095 $27,774 $55,566 $19,192 24.9% -1.8% 34% 36% 1.0 6.17 
Jun-12 $106,153 $10,611  $27,792  $19,192 22.7%  38%    
Dec-11 $102,094 $14,221 $28,521 $36,298 $65,354 $8,451 12.5% 13.4% 39% 44% 0.3 3.58 
Jun-11 $150,505 $14,300  $29,056  $8,589 11.0%  49%    
Dec-10 $141,382 $14,722 $25,978 $28,403 $55,171 $4,071 5.9% 20.7% 52% 47% 0.2 5.44 
Jun-10 $97,887 $11,256  $26,768  $11,967 20.0%  42%    
Dec-09 $115,906 $8,223 $14,312 $24,513 $44,036 $18,861 29.1% 9.5% 34% 33% 1.3 8.10 
Jun-09 $93,168 $6,089  $19,523  $39,057 67.3%  31%    
Dec-08 $67,381 $12,462 $23,870 $28,060 $58,065 $38,672 63.3% 16.1% 44% 41% 1.6 2.82 
Jun-08 $167,398 $11,408  $30,005  $42,127 55.6%  38%    
Dec-07 $159,123 $6,998 $13,611 $19,588 $33,518 $45,191 63.2% 12.4% 36% 41% 3.3 11.69 
Jun-07 $84,159 $6,613  $13,930  $2,862 11.5%  47%    
Dec-06 $61,211 $7,066 $12,566 $13,440 $25,440 $2,437 11.2% 36.1% 53% 49% 0.2 4.87 
Jun-06 $61,214 $5,500  $12,000  $2,623 13.8%  46%    
Dec-05 $54,219 $9,743 $9,743 $20,742 20,742 $1,313 7.7% 30.8% 47% 47% 0.1 5.56 
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Appendix 7.8 : Economic data – CVRD-Vale 
Source : Vale (2006 – 2016) & Yahoo Finance (2016d) 
 EV EBITDA EBITDA 
annual 
Group 
revenue 
(6 mth) 
Group 
revenue 
(12 mth) 
Net debt Gearing Group 
attributable 
ROCE 
EBITDA 
to 
revenue 
EBITDA to 
annual 
revenue 
Net debt 
to 
EBITDA 
EV/ 
EBITDA 
Dec-15 $42,215 $3,266 $7,081 $12,404 $25,609 $25,262 41.4% -7.9% 26% 28% 3.6 5.96 
Jun-15 $56,966 $3,815  $13,205  $26,615 34.8%  29%    
Dec-14 $66,985 $5,191 $13,353 $18,134 $37,539 $24,833 30.6% 6.8% 29% 36% 1.9 5.02 
Jun-14 $90,971 $8,162  $19,405  $22,797 25.0%  42%    
Dec-13 $102,707 $12,793 $22,679 $26,083 $48,050 $24,124 27.1% 12.9% 49% 47% 1.1 4.53 
Jun-13 $91,556 $9,886  $21,967  $23,794 24.9%  45%    
Dec-12 $132,715 $7,728 $17,642 $23,673 $47,694 $24,708 24.8% 7.8% 33% 37% 1.4 7.52 
Jun-12 $123,138 $9,914  $24,021  $20,851 20.3%  41%    
Dec-11 $128,833 $16,582 $34,234 $32,744 $60,946 $19,502 19.7% 25.6% 51% 56% 0.6 3.76 
Jun-11 $177,841 $17,652  $28,202  $11,126 11.2%  63%    
Dec-10 $197,216 $16,772 $24,955 $30,767 $47,029 $16,830 19.0% 19.5% 55% 53% 0.7 7.90 
Jun-10 $145,611 $8,183  $16,262  $16,848 20.9%  50%    
Dec-09 $171,255 $5,302 $9,165 $13,039 $23,311 $15,538 20.6% 6.5% 41% 39% 1.7 18.69 
Jun-09 $103,132 $3,863  $10,272  $11,244 17.7%  38%    
Dec-08 $69,138 $9,342 $19,018 $8,481 $27,426 $7,837 15.0% 20.3% 110% 69% 0.4 3.64 
Jun-08 $194,335 $9,676  $18,945  $18,136 30.3%  51%    
Dec-07 $177,404 $7,533 $15,774 $16,061 $32,242 $17,811 34.9% 19.8% 47% 49% 1.1 11.25 
Jun-07 $232,976 $8,241  $16,181  $17,265 37.2%  51%    
Dec-06 $162,134 $5,345 $9,150 $12,877 $20,363 $18,133 48.0% 14.2% 42% 45% 2.0 17.72 
Jun-06 $120,301 $3,805  $7,486  $3,899 18.5%  51%    
Dec-05 $202,027 $6,540 $6,540 $13,405 13,405 $3,969 24.9% 28.1% 49% 49% 0.6 30.89 
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Appendix 7.9 : Quarterly production output – Anglo American 
Source : Anglo American (2006 – 2016) 
  Copper 
(t) 
Nickel 
(t) 
Iron ore 
(Mt) 
Coal  
(Mt) 
PGM’s 
(koz) 
Diamonds 
(Mct) 
Gold 
(oz) 
Dec 05 158,750   5,225   7.8   14.7  626   12.3  1,542  
Mar 06 163,800   6,600   7.8   23.7  716   12.8   829  
Jun 06 163,800   6,600   7.8   23.7  716   12.8   829  
Sep 06 163,800   6,600   7.8   23.7  716   12.8   829  
Dec 06 163,800   6,600   7.8   23.7  716   12.8   829  
Mar 07 146,387   6,462   7.6   22.9  638   12.6   556  
Jun 07 170,300   6,200   7.8   25.7  611   13.7   556  
Sep 07 170,300   6,200   7.8   25.7  611   13.7   -  
Dec 07 176,400   6,500   9.0   23.6  669   12.1   -  
Mar 08 159,700   4,600   8.2   22.3  518   11.8   -  
Jun 08 161,000   5,000   8.9   25.8  573   12.5   -  
Sep 08 148,600   5,600   10.3   25.7  543   13.1   -  
Dec 08 172,000   4,800   10.1   25.7  842   10.8   -  
Mar 09 151,000   4,500   10.0   22.2  404  1.1   -  
Jun 09 165,900   5,600   10.3   25.0  652  5.5   -  
Sep 09 168,500   4,900   11.9   26.2  629  7.9   -  
Dec 09 185,900   4,900   12.4   23.7  604   10.1   -  
Mar 10 160,800   4,800   12.3   22.4  595  7.0   -  
Jun 10 154,700   5,300   11.5   24.0  601  8.4   -  
Sep 10 153,400   5,700   11.8   26.2  648  9.0   -  
Dec 10 154,400   4,400   11.8   25.3  640  8.5   -  
Mar 11 138,800   6,100   9.9   21.1  568  7.4   -  
Jun 11 144,500   6,000   11.5   23.7  593  8.1   -  
Sep 11 154,000   7,000   12.2   24.9  667  4.2   -  
Dec 11 170,000   9,900   12.4   25.5  583  6.5   -  
Mar 12 155,200   10,800   11.7   22.3  93  2.8   -  
Jun 12 160,020   12,600   12.9   25.4  584  3.3   -  
Sep 12 157,300   7,600   12.5   25.9  626  6.4   -  
Dec 12 172,900   7,400   9.0   25.8  416  8.1   -  
Mar 13 170,500   6,200   10.3   22.3  583  6.4   -  
Jun 13 176,700   6,300   11.3   25.0  595  7.9   -  
Sep 13 207,300   9,500   9.5   26.7  623  7.7   -  
Dec 13 214,400   10,200   11.3   24.8  520  9.1   -  
Mar 14 202,000   9,200   11.3   22.8  357  7.5   -  
Jun 14 194,400   10,600   11.5   12.9  358  8.5   -  
Sep 14 176,900   10,700   13.0   14.1  514  8.2   -  
Dec 14 174,800   6,700   13.1   25.8  594  8.4   -  
Mar 15 171,800   6,700   13.4   24.0  536  7.7   -  
Jun 15 184,500   6,300   12.2   13.9  572  8.0   -  
Sep 15 171,500   6,800   14.3   14.3  614  6.0   -  
Dec 15 181,400   10,500   14.2   22.5  598  7.1   -  
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Appendix 7.10 : Quarterly production output – BHP Billiton 
Source : BHP Billiton (2005 – 2015) & South 32 (2015) 
  Petroleum 
(Mbbl) 
Aluminium 
(kt) 
Base metals 
(kt) 
Diamonds 
(kct) 
Iron ore 
(Mt) 
Met. coal 
(Mt) 
Energy coal 
(Mt) 
Dec-05 29  341  317   640  24.26 8.91  21.43 
Mar-06 26  329  294   512  21.12  8.46 18.67  
Jun-06 31  344  312   583  26.11  9.22 21.79  
Sep-06 31  337  250   487  25.00  9.24  21.78  
Dec-06 28  338  301   937  25.37  8.96  22.03  
Mar-07 28  331  358   889  22.88  9.08  20.93  
Jun-07 30  334  342   911  25.74  11.13  21.23  
Sep-07 30  337  308  1,022  25.86  9.57  19.62  
Dec-07 30  338  348   843  27.74  9.64  20.61  
Mar-08 33  318  329   620  28.41  6.84  16.39  
Jun-08 36  305  391   864  29.92  9.13  18.72  
Sep-08 35  309  309   773  29.82  9.21  18.06  
Dec-08 33  310  308   594  29.35  10.15  16.48  
Mar-09 32  304  283   951  28.18  7.59  15.22  
Jun-09 38  310  307   903  27.04  9.46  17.71  
Sep-09 41  313  284   780  30.10  9.40  18.06  
Dec-09 39  313  271   760  32.44  8.89  15.46  
Mar-10 37  306  229   770  31.16  8.15  16.34  
Jun-10 41  309  291   740  31.24  10.92  16.27  
Sep-10 43  314  291   703  31.98  10.29  17.11  
Dec-10 37  314  302   676  33.66  7.78  16.51  
Mar-11 36  305  274   551  33.23  6.67   6.67  
Jun-11 43  313  272   576  35.52  7.92  18.34  
Sep-11 51  315  220   457  39.57  9.29  18.46  
Dec-11 58  313  280   481  41.07  8.49  16.92  
Mar-12 57  277  281   433  37.94  7.33  17.24  
Jun-12 56  248  313   413  40.89  8.10  18.48  
Sep-12 61  270  274   313  39.77  8.93  19.61  
Dec-12 60  297  295   295  42.19  8.88  18.26  
Mar-13 55  303  434   322  40.20  8.96  16.00  
Jun-13 59  310  462   -  47.68  10.85  18.56  
Sep-13 63  310  403   -  48.84  10.18  19.64  
Dec-13 58  302  440   -  48.86  11.54  17.77  
Mar-14 61  286  414   -  49.56  11.46  17.72  
Jun-14 65  276  470   -  56.64  11.88  18.36  
Sep-14 67  261  389   -  57.09  12.76  17.84  
Dec-14 64  256  424   -  56.35  11.13  10.12  
Mar-15 62  245  460   -  58.97  9.65  10.47  
Jun-15 63  241  435   -  60.08  11.39  10.60  
Sep-15 65   -  377   -  61.31  10.44   9.85  
Dec-15 60  242  385   -  56.96  10.48   9.54  
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Appendix 7.11 : Quarterly production output – Rio Tinto 
Source : Rio Tinto (2006 – 2016a) 
  Aluminium 
(kt) 
Iron ore 
(Mt) 
Diamonds 
(Mct) 
Copper  
(kt) 
Energy (Mt) 
Dec-05 213  31.12 8.90  78.6  36.61  
Mar-06 207  28.66  6.32  85.6  37.09  
Jun-06 207  33.31  9.20  83.9  39.77  
Sep-06 215  35.74   10.07  75.6  38.96  
Dec-06 216  35.05  9.56  54.0  40.57  
Mar-07 211  32.24  5.03  101.6  37.39  
Jun-07 217  37.11  6.41  100.7  36.16  
Sep-07 216  36.39  6.77  98.7  37.03  
Dec-07 834  38.95  7.80  89.0  39.02  
Mar-08 1,025  37.37  3.29  78.3  36.34  
Jun-08 1,014  41.86  4.55  82.8  36.48  
Sep-08 1,013  42.40  6.11  68.9  40.50  
Dec-08 1,011  31.75  6.85  91.6  39.77  
Mar-09 948  31.64  5.50  104.3  36.19  
Jun-09 942  44.58  1.28  102.0  26.80  
Sep-09 956  46.97  2.78  100.6  29.35  
Dec-09 957  47.22  4.45  105.5  22.11  
Mar-10 937  43.36  3.49  95.9  14.93  
Jun-10 952  43.61  3.61  90.6  16.67  
Sep-10 939  47.60  3.53  106.7  16.54  
Dec-10 962  50.05  3.19  99.5  14.37  
Mar-11 944  41.87  2.49  95.2   4.02  
Jun-11 958  48.85  2.73  89.9   5.09  
Sep-11 962  49.83  3.53  68.3   5.29  
Dec-11 961  51.20  2.96  80.9   4.43  
Mar-12 854  45.64  3.51  74.1   4.13  
Jun-12 841  48.63  2.80  49.3   4.77  
Sep-12 855  52.62  3.70  69.7   5.51  
Dec-12 906  51.96  3.24  86.2   6.22  
Mar-13 834  48.25  3.23  73.0   5.05  
Jun-13 901  51.82  4.13  70.4   5.97  
Sep-13 878  53.37  4.15  68.3   6.32  
Dec-13 853  55.51  4.49  81.0   5.62  
Mar-14 832  52.33  3.65  75.8   5.86  
Jun-14 817  57.53  3.83  94.6   4.44  
Sep-14 848  60.45  3.54  83.5   5.49  
Dec-14 842  63.23  2.84  40.7   4.77  
Mar-15 809  59.41  4.15  68.2   4.76  
Jun-15 818  63.89  4.69  59.9   4.07  
Sep-15 830  69.31  4.27  35.8   4.61  
Dec-15 864  70,42  4,26  49.2   5.18  
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Appendix 7.12 : Quarterly production output – CVRD-Vale 
Source : Vale (2006 – 2016) 
  Iron Ore 
(Mt) 
Coal  
(Mt) 
Nickel 
(kt)  
Copper 
(kt) 
Fertilizer 
(Mt) 
Bauxite 
(Mt) 
Dec-05 60.56   -   -  22   -   -  
Mar-06 65.90   -   -  30   -   -  
Jun-06 69.53   -   -  60   -  1.86  
Sep-06 68.15   -  69  85   -  1.83  
Dec-06 67.35   -  61  78   -  1.73  
Mar-07 73.75  0.66  63  68   -  2.12  
Jun-07 78.30  1.14  55  65   -  2.58  
Sep-07 80.09  0.97  69  74   -  2.66  
Dec-07 74.48  0.87  61  73   -  2.46  
Mar-08 78.05  1.08  69  77   -  2.42  
Jun-08 85.88  1.04  72  80   -  3.19  
Sep-08 63.27  1.09  73  82   -  3.54  
Dec-08 48.33  0.95  65  73   -  2.98  
Mar-09 57.69  1.50  59  61   -  2.85  
Jun-09 66.78  1.70  33  31   -  3.30  
Sep-09 63.44  1.26  30  32   -  3.31  
Dec-09 69.05  1.41  33  34   -  3.26  
Mar-10 75.86  1.85  37  40  1.10  3.41  
Jun-10 82.61  1.87  44  58  1.40  3.80  
Sep-10 80.26  1.74  65  76  1.78  3.85  
Dec-10 71.54  1.42  59  70  1.74   -  
Mar-11 80.25  1.30  56  63  1.85   -  
Jun-11 87.89  0.90  58  84  1.92   -  
Sep-11 82.94  2.69  69  85  1.83   -  
Dec-11 69.99  1.50  63  73  1.82   -  
Mar-12 80.54  1.89  61  70  2.01   -  
Jun-12 83.92  1.73  49  68  2.07   -  
Sep-12 85.49  1.95  64  81  2.06   -  
Dec-12 67.53  1.75  65  90  1.99   -  
Mar-13 70.57  2.37  65  91  1.89   -  
Jun-13 85.89  2.37  62  95  2.10   -  
Sep-13 84.62  2.25  68  95  2.28   -  
Dec-13 71.06  1.78  68  88  1.93   -  
Mar-14 79.44  2.20  62  81  2.12   -  
Jun-14 88.65  2.34  72   105  2.15   -  
Sep-14 86.29  2.31  74   105  2.20   -  
Dec-14 77.41  1.69  69   107  1.99   -  
Mar-15 89.31  2.01  67   105  2.11   -  
Jun-15 90.73  2.05  72  99  1.93   -  
Sep-15 88.41  1.58  83   113  2.12   -  
Dec-15 77.54  1.66  74   112  1.61   -  
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Appendix 7.13 : Bulk commodity and energy prices 
Source : World Bank (2016) 
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Appendix 7.14 : Metals and diamonds prices 
Source : World Bank (2016) 
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Appendix 7.15 : Fertaliser prices 
Source : World Bank (2016) 
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Appendix 7.16 : Indexed price and commodity calculation – Anglo American 
 Copper Nickel Iron ore Coal Platinum Diamonds Gold Others 
Dec-05 8% 2% 6% 10% 11% 10% 8% 47% 
Mar-06 10% 2% 6% 15% 14% 10% 5% 44% 
Jun-06 15% 3% 6% 17% 16% 10% 6% 44% 
Sep-06 16% 4% 6% 17% 17% 11% 6% 44% 
Dec-06 15% 5% 6% 15% 16% 12% 6% 44% 
Mar-07 11% 6% 7% 17% 15% 12% 4% 38% 
Jun-07 17% 7% 9% 21% 15% 13% 4% 38% 
Sep-07 17% 4% 11% 24% 15% 13% 0% 38% 
Dec-07 16% 4% 18% 27% 19% 13% 0% 38% 
Mar-08 16% 3% 18% 35% 19% 13% 0% 32% 
Jun-08 18% 3% 19% 50% 22% 15% 0% 32% 
Sep-08 15% 2% 19% 58% 16% 16% 0% 32% 
Dec-08 9% 1% 8% 33% 14% 13% 0% 32% 
Mar-09 7% 1% 8% 22% 8% 1% 0% 26% 
Jun-09 10% 2% 7% 23% 15% 7% 0% 26% 
Sep-09 13% 2% 12% 26% 15% 9% 0% 26% 
Dec-09 16% 2% 13% 26% 16% 12% 0% 26% 
Mar-10 15% 2% 18% 30% 18% 8% 0% 19% 
Jun-10 14% 3% 20% 33% 19% 10% 0% 19% 
Sep-10 14% 3% 18% 34% 19% 11% 0% 19% 
Dec-10 17% 2% 21% 38% 21% 11% 0% 19% 
Mar-11 17% 4% 20% 38% 20% 9% 0% 14% 
Jun-11 17% 3% 23% 40% 20% 11% 0% 14% 
Sep-11 18% 4% 24% 42% 23% 6% 0% 14% 
Dec-11 16% 4% 20% 41% 17% 9% 0% 14% 
Mar-12 17% 5% 18% 35% 3% 4% 0% 13% 
Jun-12 16% 5% 20% 34% 17% 4% 0% 13% 
Sep-12 16% 3% 16% 32% 18% 8% 0% 13% 
Dec-12 18% 3% 12% 31% 13% 10% 0% 13% 
Mar-13 17% 2% 17% 29% 18% 8% 0% 8% 
Jun-13 16% 2% 16% 30% 17% 10% 0% 8% 
Sep-13 19% 3% 14% 29% 17% 10% 0% 8% 
Dec-13 20% 3% 17% 28% 14% 11% 0% 8% 
Mar-14 18% 3% 15% 24% 10% 9% 0% 9% 
Jun-14 17% 4% 13% 13% 10% 11% 0% 9% 
Sep-14 16% 5% 13% 13% 14% 10% 0% 9% 
Dec-14 15% 2% 11% 23% 14% 11% 0% 9% 
Mar-15 13% 2% 9% 20% 12% 10% 0% 6% 
Jun-15 14% 2% 8% 11% 12% 10% 0% 6% 
Sep-15 12% 2% 9% 11% 12% 8% 0% 6% 
Dec-15 11% 2% 7% 16% 10% 9% 0% 6% 
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Appendix 7.17 : Indexed price and commodity calculation – BHP Billiton 
 Petroleum Aluminium Base 
metals 
Diamonds Iron 
ore 
Met. 
coal 
Energy 
coal 
Others 
Dec-05 19% 22% 16% 5% 16% 8% 11% 2% 
Mar-06 20% 27% 20% 4% 15% 7% 9% 1% 
Jun-06 26% 31% 31% 5% 18% 7% 12% 1% 
Sep-06 26% 29% 27% 4% 18% 7% 12% 1% 
Dec-06 20% 32% 30% 8% 19% 7% 11% 1% 
Mar-07 20% 32% 29% 8% 20% 6% 12% 0% 
Jun-07 25% 32% 36% 8% 26% 9% 13% 0% 
Sep-07 28% 30% 33% 10% 34% 9% 14% 0% 
Dec-07 33% 28% 35% 9% 53% 12% 18% 0% 
Mar-08 39% 30% 36% 7% 57% 14% 20% 1% 
Jun-08 54% 31% 46% 10% 59% 25% 28% 1% 
Sep-08 50% 30% 33% 9% 51% 25% 31% 1% 
Dec-08 23% 19% 17% 7% 23% 18% 16% 1% 
Mar-09 17% 14% 13% 11% 21% 7% 12% 3% 
Jun-09 28% 16% 20% 10% 18% 8% 13% 3% 
Sep-09 35% 20% 23% 9% 27% 11% 14% 3% 
Dec-09 36% 22% 25% 9% 33% 11% 13% 3% 
Mar-10 36% 23% 23% 9% 42% 12% 17% 1% 
Jun-10 40% 22% 28% 9% 52% 18% 17% 1% 
Sep-10 40% 23% 29% 8% 46% 15% 17% 1% 
Dec-10 40% 25% 36% 8% 54% 12% 19% 1% 
Mar-11 44% 26% 37% 7% 62% 16% 9% 0% 
Jun-11 59% 28% 35% 7% 65% 18% 24% 0% 
Sep-11 66% 26% 27% 6% 72% 19% 24% 0% 
Dec-11 74% 23% 29% 6% 60% 15% 21% 0% 
Mar-12 79% 21% 32% 6% 56% 11% 21% 0% 
Jun-12 72% 17% 34% 5% 59% 13% 19% 0% 
Sep-12 78% 18% 29% 4% 46% 11% 19% 0% 
Dec-12 76% 20% 32% 4% 53% 10% 17% 0% 
Mar-13 72% 21% 48% 4% 62% 11% 16% 1% 
Jun-13 73% 20% 46% 0% 62% 11% 17% 1% 
Sep-13 83% 19% 40% 0% 67% 10% 16% 1% 
Dec-13 75% 18% 44% 0% 68% 11% 16% 1% 
Mar-14 78% 17% 40% 0% 62% 10% 15% 0% 
Jun-14 85% 17% 44% 0% 60% 9% 14% 0% 
Sep-14 84% 18% 38% 0% 54% 10% 13% 0% 
Dec-14 59% 17% 39% 0% 43% 9% 7% 0% 
Mar-15 39% 15% 37% 0% 39% 7% 7% 2% 
Jun-15 47% 15% 37% 0% 36% 7% 7% 2% 
Sep-15 39% 0% 28% 0% 35% 6% 6% 2% 
Dec-15 31% 12% 26% 0% 28% 6% 5% 2% 
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Appendix 7.18 : Indexed price and commodity calculation – Rio Tinto 
 Aluminium Iron Ore Diamonds Copper Energy Others 
Dec-05 13% 27% 17% 23% 19% 1% 
Mar-06 16% 25% 12% 34% 19% 1% 
Jun-06 18% 30% 18% 49% 22% 1% 
Sep-06 17% 33% 20% 47% 21% 1% 
Dec-06 19% 33% 21% 31% 20% 1% 
Mar-07 19% 35% 12% 49% 21% 0% 
Jun-07 20% 48% 15% 62% 22% 0% 
Sep-07 18% 60% 16% 61% 27% 0% 
Dec-07 67% 94% 20% 52% 35% 0% 
Mar-08 92% 94% 9% 49% 44% 1% 
Jun-08 97% 105% 13% 56% 54% 1% 
Sep-08 92% 92% 19% 43% 71% 1% 
Dec-08 60% 31% 21% 29% 40% 1% 
Mar-09 42% 29% 17% 29% 28% 13% 
Jun-09 46% 38% 4% 38% 19% 13% 
Sep-09 57% 54% 8% 48% 22% 13% 
Dec-09 63% 60% 13% 57% 18% 13% 
Mar-10 66% 74% 10% 56% 15% 8% 
Jun-10 65% 91% 11% 51% 18% 8% 
Sep-10 64% 86% 11% 62% 17% 8% 
Dec-10 74% 102% 10% 69% 17% 8% 
Mar-11 77% 98% 8% 74% 6% 8% 
Jun-11 82% 112% 9% 67% 7% 8% 
Sep-11 75% 115% 12% 49% 7% 8% 
Dec-11 66% 94% 10% 49% 5% 8% 
Mar-12 61% 85% 12% 50% 5% 8% 
Jun-12 54% 89% 9% 31% 5% 8% 
Sep-12 54% 77% 12% 43% 5% 8% 
Dec-12 59% 82% 10% 55% 6% 8% 
Mar-13 54% 94% 10% 47% 5% 1% 
Jun-13 54% 85% 13% 41% 6% 1% 
Sep-13 51% 93% 13% 39% 5% 1% 
Dec-13 49% 98% 14% 47% 5% 1% 
Mar-14 46% 83% 11% 43% 5% 0% 
Jun-14 48% 77% 12% 52% 3% 0% 
Sep-14 55% 72% 11% 47% 4% 0% 
Dec-14 54% 62% 9% 22% 3% 0% 
Mar-15 48% 49% 13% 32% 3% 0% 
Jun-15 47% 49% 15% 29% 3% 0% 
Sep-15 43% 50% 13% 15% 3% 0% 
Dec-15 42% 43% 13% 19% 3% 0% 
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Appendix 7.19 : Indexed price and commodity calculation – CVRD-Vale 
 Iron ore Coal Nickel Copper Fertilizer Bauxite Others 
Dec-05 29% 0% 0% 3% 0% 11% 9% 
Mar-06 32% 0% 0% 1% 0% 11% 7% 
Jun-06 35% 0% 0% 3% 0% 11% 7% 
Sep-06 35% 0% 27% 4% 0% 7% 7% 
Dec-06 36% 0% 27% 4% 0% 5% 7% 
Mar-07 45% 0% 34% 3% 0% 4% 5% 
Jun-07 57% 1% 35% 3% 0% 5% 5% 
Sep-07 74% 1% 28% 4% 0% 5% 5% 
Dec-07 102% 1% 24% 3% 0% 4% 5% 
Mar-08 111% 1% 27% 4% 0% 5% 5% 
Jun-08 121% 1% 25% 4% 0% 7% 5% 
Sep-08 78% 2% 18% 4% 0% 7% 5% 
Dec-08 27% 1% 9% 2% 0% 4% 5% 
Mar-09 30% 1% 8% 1% 0% 3% 6% 
Jun-09 32% 1% 6% 1% 0% 4% 6% 
Sep-09 41% 1% 7% 1% 0% 4% 6% 
Dec-09 50% 1% 8% 1% 0% 5% 6% 
Mar-10 74% 2% 10% 2% 4% 5% 4% 
Jun-10 97% 2% 13% 3% 6% 6% 4% 
Sep-10 82% 2% 18% 4% 8% 6% 4% 
Dec-10 83% 1% 18% 4% 8% 0% 4% 
Mar-11 106% 2% 20% 4% 10% 0% 4% 
Jun-11 114% 1% 19% 5% 12% 0% 4% 
Sep-11 108% 3% 20% 5% 12% 0% 4% 
Dec-11 73% 2% 15% 4% 12% 0% 4% 
Mar-12 84% 2% 16% 4% 13% 0% 5% 
Jun-12 87% 2% 11% 4% 13% 0% 5% 
Sep-12 71% 2% 14% 4% 13% 0% 5% 
Dec-12 60% 2% 15% 5% 12% 0% 5% 
Mar-13 77% 2% 15% 5% 11% 0% 2% 
Jun-13 80% 2% 12% 4% 12% 0% 2% 
Sep-13 83% 2% 13% 4% 11% 0% 2% 
Dec-13 71% 2% 12% 4% 7% 0% 2% 
Mar-14 71% 2% 12% 4% 7% 0% 3% 
Jun-14 67% 2% 18% 5% 8% 0% 3% 
Sep-14 58% 2% 18% 5% 8% 0% 3% 
Dec-14 43% 1% 15% 5% 8% 0% 3% 
Mar-15 42% 1% 13% 4% 8% 0% 1% 
Jun-15 39% 1% 12% 4% 7% 0% 1% 
Sep-15 36% 1% 12% 4% 8% 0% 1% 
Dec-15 27% 1% 9% 4% 7% 0% 1% 
  
Page 112 
 
Appendix 7.20 : Indexed semi-annual value drivers data – Anglo American 
Source : Anglo American (2006 – 2016) 
  Enterprise value Gearing EBITDA margin Theoretical revenue 
Dec-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Jun-06 1.1 0.6 1.1 1.2 
Dec-06 1.3 0.6 2.2 1.2 
Jun-07 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Dec-07 1.7 1.0 1.9 1.4 
Jun-08 1.8 1.0 1.4 1.6 
Dec-08 0.8 2.0 1.2 1.1 
Jun-09 0.9 1.9 1.0 0.9 
Dec-09 1.3 1.7 1.1 1.1 
Jun-10 1.1 1.6 1.3 1.2 
Dec-10 1.4 1.0 1.3 1.3 
Jun-11 1.4 0.2 1.4 1.3 
Dec-11 1.0 0.2 1.3 1.2 
Jun-12 0.9 0.4 1.1 1.1 
Dec-12 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.0 
Jun-13 0.7 1.2 1.0 1.0 
Dec-13 0.8 1.3 1.0 1.0 
Jun-14 0.8 1.4 1.0 0.8 
Dec-14 0.7 1.7 0.7 0.8 
Jun-15 0.6 1.9 0.9 0.6 
Dec-15 0.4 2.2 0.4 0.6 
 
Appendix 7.21 : Indexed annual value drivers data – Anglo American 
Source : Anglo American (2006 – 2016) 
 EV ROCE Net debt to EBIDTA EBITDA multiple 
Dec-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Dec-06 1.3 1.3 0.5 1.0 
Dec-07 1.7 2.0 0.8 1.2 
Dec-08 0.8 1.9 1.7 0.6 
Dec-09 1.3 0.8 2.9 1.7 
Dec-10 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1 
Dec-11 1.0 1.4 0.2 0.6 
Dec-12 1.0 0.7 1.9 1.1 
Dec-13 0.8 0.6 2.2 0.8 
Dec-14 0.7 0.5 3.3 0.9 
Dec-15 0.4 0.3 5.2 0.7 
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Appendix 7.22 : Indexed semi-annual value drivers data – BHP Billiton 
Source : BHP Billiton (2005 – 2015) & South 32 (2015) 
 Enterprise Value Gearing EBITDA Margin Theoretical Revenue 
Dec-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Jun-06 1.2 1.1 1.8 1.3 
Dec-06 1.1 0.8 1.1 1.3 
Jun-07 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.5 
Dec-07 2.0 1.1 1.0 1.9 
Jun-08 2.2 0.7 1.1 2.5 
Dec-08 1.1 0.4 1.1 1.2 
Jun-09 1.5 0.5 0.5 1.1 
Dec-09 2.1 0.6 1.0 1.5 
Jun-10 1.6 0.3 1.1 1.9 
Dec-10 2.3 0.2 1.1 2.0 
Jun-11 2.3 0.4 1.5 2.4 
Dec-11 2.0 1.0 1.1 2.3 
Jun-12 1.9 1.0 1.5 2.2 
Dec-12 2.3 1.2 0.9 2.1 
Jun-13 1.8 1.1 1.0 2.3 
Dec-13 2.1 1.3 1.1 2.3 
Jun-14 2.0 0.9 0.9 2.3 
Dec-14 1.5 0.9 1.1 1.8 
Jun-15 1.6 1.0 1.5 1.6 
Dec-15 1.1 1.0 0.7 1.2 
 
Appendix 7.23 : Indexed annual value drivers data – BHP Billiton 
Source : BHP Billiton (2005 – 2015) & South 32 (2015) 
 EV ROCE Net debt to EBIDTA EBITDA margin EBITDA multiple 
Jun-06  1.0   1.0   1.0   1.0   1.0  
Jun-07  1.4   1.0   1.4   0.7   1.6  
Jun-08  1.8   1.0   0.9   0.7   1.7  
Jun-09  1.2   0.7   0.9   0.6   1.7  
Jun-10  1.4   0.7   0.4   0.7   1.4  
Jun-11  1.9   1.2   0.5   0.9   1.5  
Jun-12  1.6   0.4   2.3   0.9   1.3  
Jun-13  1.5   0.6   3.2   0.7   1.4  
Jun-14  1.7   0.4   2.6   0.7   1.4  
Jun-15  1.3   0.1   2.6   0.9   1.1  
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Appendix 7.24 : Indexed semi-annual value drivers data – Rio Tinto 
Source : Rio Tinto (2006 – 2016a) 
 Enterprise value Gearing Theoretical revenue 
Dec-05 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Jun-06 1.1 1.8 1.4 
Dec-06 1.1 1.5 1.3 
Jun-07 1.6 1.5 1.7 
Dec-07 2.9 8.2 2.7 
Jun-08 3.1 7.2 3.3 
Dec-08 1.2 8.2 1.8 
Jun-09 1.7 8.7 1.6 
Dec-09 2.1 3.8 2.2 
Jun-10 1.8 2.6 2.4 
Dec-10 2.6 0.8 2.8 
Jun-11 2.8 1.4 2.8 
Dec-11 1.9 1.6 2.3 
Jun-12 2.0 3.0 2.0 
Dec-12 2.3 3.2 2.2 
Jun-13 1.8 3.7 2.0 
Dec-13 2.2 3.3 2.1 
Jun-14 2.0 2.4 1.9 
Dec-14 1.8 2.4 1.5 
Jun-15 1.6 2.8 1.4 
Dec-15 1.3 3.1 1.2 
 
Appendix 7.25 : Indexed annual value drivers data – Rio Tinto 
Source : Rio Tinto (2006 – 2016a) 
 EV ROCE Net debt to EBIDTA EBITDA margin EBITDA multiple 
Dec-05  1.0   1.0   1.0   1.0   1.0  
Dec-06  1.1   1.2   1.4   1.1   0.9  
Dec-07  2.9   0.4   24.6   0.9   2.1  
Dec-08  1.2   0.5   12.0   0.9   0.5  
Dec-09  2.1   0.3   9.8   0.7   1.5  
Dec-10  2.6   0.7   1.2   1.0   1.0  
Dec-11  1.9   0.4   2.2   0.9   0.6  
Dec-12  2.3   (0.1)  7.1   0.8   1.1  
Dec-13  2.2   0.3   6.4   0.8   1.0  
Dec-14  1.8   0.4   4.9   0.8   0.9  
Dec-15  1.3   0.2   8.5   0.7   1.0  
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Appendix 7.26 : Indexed semi-annual value drivers data – CVRD-Vale 
Source : Vale (2006 - 2016) 
 Enterprise value Gearing Theoretical revenue 
Dec-05 - - - 
Jun-06 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Dec-06 1.3 2.6 1.4 
Jun-07 1.9 2.0 1.9 
Dec-07 1.5 1.9 2.5 
Jun-08 1.6 1.6 2.9 
Dec-08 0.6 0.8 0.9 
Jun-09 0.9 1.0 0.9 
Dec-09 1.4 1.1 1.3 
Jun-10 1.2 1.1 2.3 
Dec-10 1.6 1.0 2.1 
Jun-11 1.5 0.6 2.8 
Dec-11 1.1 1.1 2.0 
Jun-12 1.0 1.1 2.2 
Dec-12 1.1 1.3 1.8 
Jun-13 0.8 1.3 2.0 
Dec-13 0.9 1.5 1.8 
Jun-14 0.8 1.4 1.8 
Dec-14 0.6 1.7 1.3 
Jun-15 0.5 1.9 1.2 
Dec-15 0.4 2.2 0.9 
 
Appendix 7.27 : Indexed annual value drivers data – CVRD-Vale 
Source : Vale (2006 - 2016) 
 EV ROCE Net debt to EBIDTA EBITDA margin EBITDA multiple 
Dec-05 - - - - - 
Dec-06  1.0   1.0   1.0   1.0   1.0  
Dec-07  1.1   1.4   0.6   1.1   0.6  
Dec-08  0.4   1.4   0.2   1.5   0.2  
Dec-09  1.1   0.5   0.9   0.9   1.1  
Dec-10  1.2   1.4   0.3   1.2   0.4  
Dec-11  0.8   1.8   0.3   1.3   0.2  
Dec-12  0.8   0.5   0.7   0.8   0.4  
Dec-13  0.6   0.9   0.5   1.1   0.3  
Dec-14  0.4   0.5   0.9   0.8   0.3  
Dec-15  0.3   (0.6)  1.8   0.6   0.3  
 
 
